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CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF PROVISIONAL
CREDITOR REMEDIES: THE COST OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS
Robert E. Scott*
In recent years a series of Supreme Court decisions' has purported
to envelop the rights of defaulting debtors in an enlarged concept
of procedural due process. The central theme underlying this development is clearly an attempt by the Court to impose some degree
of constitutional control on the exercise of provisional creditor remedies.2 The path that leads from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I wish to thank Jerry Mashaw
and Warren Schwartz of the University of Virginia School of Law for valuable comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Any errors that remain are, of course, my sole
responsibility.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 166
(1972); D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
In addition to these cases bearing directly on the due process rights of the defaulting debtor,
the Supreme Court has, in a series of related decisions, enunciated the scope of due process
protection accorded property interests in general. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 US. 535 (1971);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In Sniadach, the Court held that, in the absence of a special state
or creditor interest, due process requires that a debtor be given notice and an opportunity to
be heard prior to a pre-judgment garnishment of his wages.
I The phrase "provisional creditor remedy" covers a range of pre-judgment statutory remedies. The common thrust of all these procedures, however, is to permit a seizure of a debtor's
assets pending adjudication of an underlying claim. The principal remedies that have been
subjected to constitutional attack fall into two main categories: 1) pre-judgment attachment
or garnishment statutes permitting a seizure of the debtor's property by an unsecured creditor
either to secure jurisdiction or to prevent sequestration or removal of the debtor or his assets
prior to ultimate adjudication; 2) pre-judgment replevin statutes permitting a secured creditor to repossess assets subject to a prior security interest upon allegations of default and
insecurity.
In addition, most states have statutory provisions granting possessory liens to landlords,
innkeepers, repairmen, and warehousemen which permit them to retain goods in their custody pending payment for services rendered. These statutes have also been subject to due
process attack where they authorize an ex parte seizure by the creditor. See generally Clark
& Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The CreditorMeets the Constitution, 59 VA. L.
Rav. 355, 383-403 (1973). The issue of state involvement in the action of the creditor has
largely determined whether additional due process controls must be imposed on these various
possessory liens.
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to North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,' is however, far
from clear and the cases have provoked serious questioning of the
meaning and impact of this doctrine. 5 Due process as reflected in
In those cases where state officials have been directly involved in the enforcement of the
challenged lien, the statutes have been found constitutiQnally defective. See, e.g., Mason v.
Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (enforcement
of lien required application to the state courts); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (state officers seized debtor's assets pursuant to distress for rent procedures);
Adams v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961 (Sup. Ct.
Cal. 1974) (enforcement of the lien supervised by state agency).
Even where no state officer has been involved in the enforcement of the lien, courts considering cases involving innkeeper's and landlord's liens have generally found the requisite state
action. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972), 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970)
(landlord's lien); McQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (landlord's lien);
Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972) (landlord's lien); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel
Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. ll. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(innkeeper's lien); Ble v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710 (1973)
(innkeeper's lien). But see McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn.), af'd
450 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1971).
Although some courts have also found state action in the exercise of a repairman's lien,
Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Lee v. Cooper, C.A. No. 74-104
(D.N.J. 1974); Ford v. Dean's O.K. Tire Store, Inc., Civ. No. L.V. (D. Nev. 1974); it has
been held that these statutes are indistinguishable from self-help repossession under UCC
§ 9-503, where the overwhelming majority of courts have found no state action in a private
repossession pursuant to a statutory scheme. Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 386 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D.
Pa. 1975). See cases cited note 19 infra.
4 419 U.S. 601 (1975). Di-Chem invalidated the Georgia pre-judgment garnishment
statute as violating procedural due process. This decision was preceded by Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972), which, relying on the Sniadachrationale, extended due process protection
to preclude pre-hearing seizure of goods by a creditor pursuant to a statutory replevin action,
and by Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), in which the Court sharply limited
the effect of Fuentes by finding in the Louisiana ex parte sequestration procedure adequate
safeguards to satisfy due process. The Georgia statute in Di-Chem, however, was found to
meet neither of these standards.
I See generally Clark & Landers, Sniadach,Fuentes and Beyond: The CreditorMeets the
Constitution,59 VA. L. Rv. 355 (1973); Gardner, Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditor
and Replevin, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 17 (1972); Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin:
Due Process and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TExS TECH L. REv. 23
(1972). The series of cases from Sniadach to Di-Chem has clearly not resolved the basic
question of what satisfies procedural due process in the exercise of the traditional remedies
under attack-pre-judgment attachment, garnishment, and replevin.
It appears that the issues raised in the previous decisions will be considered once more by
the Supreme Court. The Court has recently agreed to review Curtis Circulation Co. v. Sugar,
No. 74-859, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (April 15, 1975), in which a New York district court held that
the New York pre-judgment attachment statute violated due process in permitting the ex
parte seizure of a commercial defendant's assets upon the creditor's allegations of 1) fraud in
incurring the liability and 2) assignment or removal of the property with the intent to defraud
creditors. The district court found that the New York statute did not provide sufficient
controls on the ex parte process to meet the standards of the Louisiana statute sustained in
Mitchell. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (1974). For a further discussion
of the Sugar case see notes 138, 199 infra.
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Sniadachand Fuentes v. Shevin,5 initially imposed on state enforcement procedures, in the absence of a compelling state or creditor
interest, the requirement that the defaulting debtor be granted adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before he could be
deprived, even temporarily, of any significant property interest.7
Subsequent interpretations in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.I and DiChem recognized that an ex parte deprivation of the debtor's property interest could be sustained where the enforcement process incorporated various controls, including specific factual allegations of
entitlement by the creditor, review of the request for ex parte process by a judicial officer, and an opportunity for the debtor to challenge the deprivation at an "immediate" post-seizure hearing.? Any
attempt, however, to search beyond this familiar litany for the impact of this doctrine on the debtor-creditor relationship and the
state dispute resolution mechanism, quickly reveals that there is no
consistent understanding of what procedural due process requires,
when it is satisfied, and what if any purpose it serves.
Few would question the need to reexamine the concept of procedural due process in the context of the defaulting debtor. This article will undertake such a reexamination from the perspective of
economic theory with particular focus on the enforcement costs of
due process. A recognition of the utility of applying economic analysis to legal problems requires as well a recognition of its limitations." These limitations are particularly acute in an analysis of
constitutional principle" and of the individual's relationship to the
state, and indeed in any case where fundamental social values must
be measured. 2 Economic analysis does provide, however, a method
1 407 U.S.

67 (1972).

7 See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78, 80, 83-84 (1972).

8 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
' See generally North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975).
10See Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974); Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974); Polinsky,
Economic Analysis as a PotentiallyDefective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's 'Economic Analysis of Law,' 87 HARv. L. REv. 1655 (1974).
" For a discussion of the distinction between principles and policy in constitutional adjudication, and the impact of the distinction on the scope of judicial review, see Wellington,
Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards;Some Notes on Adjudication,83
YALE L.J. 221, 265-311 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Leff, supra note 10, at 466. Leff argues that efficiency analysis is itself normative and, therefore, is limited by its own assumptions concerning human behavior. As an
example, he argues that one cannot criticize a trial-type hearing as being inefficient because
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of evaluating the effectiveness of the procedures used to implement
due process. This method seems particularly appropriate since a
cost-benefit equation has emerged as the Court's primary evaluative
tool in reviewing specific procedural requirements. A cost analysis
of legal procedure initially assumes that a fundamental goal of procedure is to produce an accurate resolution of disputes. In the particular context of debtor default, due process, to the extent that it
requires additional procedures in ex parte situations, imposes significant "direct" or litigation costs on the enforcement process. 3 These
costs justify themselves in economic terms only if they contribute
to at least a corresponding reduction in "error" costs-social costs
that arise when the legal system fails to perform accurately its assigned function of dispute resolution." The goal of allocative efficiency is to minimize the sum of these costs.
This analysis of procedural due process requirements, while
framed in terms of cost theory, is consistent with the explicit recognition by the Supreme Court that due process requirements validly
imposed on one equation of interests may not be justifiable when
applied to an alternate equation. 5 If this basic understanding is
it does not significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous resolution unless one is willing to
assume that the reduction of error is a controlling purpose of the procedures. These same
procedures may be perfectly justifiable if "[tihe social purpose of trial-type hearings [has]
little to do with eliminating error ....
It may be pure theatre for the participants, or an
alternative to ulcers, (or a way of producing them in others) .... You can't know that a thing
is not being done well until you know what it is that is being done." Id. at 466.
13 Such costs would include opportunity costs of the parties, lawyer, litigant and court time,
etc. The cost analysis contained in this article, including the designation of the factors
comprising the cost of enforcement, is derived principally from Professor Posner's definitive
analysis of the costs inherent in legal dispute resolution. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES, 399, 400-02 (1973).
11Id. at 401. Error can be caused by a failure to sustain a valid claim as well as by imposing
liability based on an erroneous or "false" claim. Error costs are themselves a product of two
factors: (1) the incidence of error (the probability that the legal dispute resolution mechanism
will not achieve a correct result); and (2) the impact of error (the costs imposed on the losing
party due to the erroneous result).
Is See generallyArnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154-58, 167-70 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in Arnett, expressed the variable nature
of procedural due process requirements by concluding:
The types of "liberty" and "property" protected by the Due Process Clause vary
widely, and what may be required under that clause in dealing with one set of interests
which it protects may not be required in dealing with another set of interests.
Id. at 155.
The recognition that the standards of due process are measured in terms of the equation
of interests presented in a given case may produce results that seem anomalous. A recent
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applied to limitations on the use of provisional creditor remedies,
the central question is whether the procedures perform their intended function. A cost evaluation of due process in this context is
necessary because the doctrine as developed appears to bear little
relationship to its originating purposes. It can be persuasively
argued that the initial concept reflected in Sniadach embodied constitutional control of creditor remedies in circumstances where the
debtor had been deprived of his expectation of just treatment because of a systemic imbalance permitting creditor overreaching. 6
The use of provisional creditor remedies where the transaction arose
out of this imbalance in the market was implicitly viewed as denying the debtor fundamental fairness. 7 The Court intended, through
due process control, to preclude most creditors in a dominant market position from using the particular remedy of pre-judgment wage
garnishment."s But using procedural due process to curtail the exercise of provisional creditor remedies creates difficulties when the
procedural arrangements upon default are, either explicitly or implicitly, subject to agreement between the parties. 9 Therefore, if
example is Gerstein v. Pugh, 419 U.S. 815 (1975), in which the Court in dictum asserted that
due process did not require a judicial hearing prior to detention pursuant to a prosecution by
information. Id. at 865. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart recognized the anomaly:
Specifically, I see no need in this case for the Court to say that the Constitution
extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is required to
test the propriety of garnisheeing a commercial bank account ... [or] the custody
of a refrigerator...
Id. at 869-70.
18 See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
7 Id.

See notes 36-37 infra and accompanying text.
An excellent illustration of the problems underlying constitutional control of the consensual relationship between debtor and creditor can be found in the debate over the extension
of procedural due process to self-help repossession under UCC § 9-503. Although the debate
has centered on whether the exercise of the creditor remedy could be attributed to the state
to satisfy the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment, the underlying issue has
been the degree to which an agreed-upon procedural remedy upon default can be subjected
to constitutional control without seriously disturbing the allocation of rights and duties upon
default. See, e.g., Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973). Although
several district courts have found the requisite state action, Boland v. Essex County Bank
and Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Gibbs v. Titleman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), rev'd 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.
1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974), the majority of courts ruling on the constitutionality
of Section 9-503 have found private conduct not to be under color of state law. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titleman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
"
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constitutional control is to increase significantly the protection afforded the debtor's interest, the bargaining process that has produced apparent assent to the procedural actions of the creditor upon
default must be examined. Sniadachand Fuentes implicitly reflect
this substantive concept of "constitutional unconscionability." In
Di-Chem, however, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to embrace the concept of substantive control while retaining the procedural requirements identified in the earlier decisions." Once procedural due process limitations are imposed independently of any
control on the debtor-creditor relationship, the benefit of these procedures in reducing the social costs of erroneous deprivations becomes a crucial question.
This article attempts to establish that, because of the substantive
problems implicit in the debtor-creditor relationship and the context of default, the post-Sniadach doctrine of procedural due process-whether given the broad interpretation reflected in Fuentes or
the narrow view of Mitchell-does not significantly increase accuracy or protection of the debtor's interest. Part I of the article reviews the doctrine as it has developed in the context of provisional
creditor remedies. This development seems to have produced a
recognition by the Court that procedural due process does not encompass a rigid procedural standard to be superimposed on provisional creditor remedies generally. Rather, the Court has concluded
that due process should be defined only after any additional procedures imposed demonstrate their potential benefit in reducing the
costs of erroneous deprivation. This development has been characterized by a shift in focus from constitutional control of creditor
behavior to a constitutional supervision of state dispute resolution
mechanisms. Once this shift in emphasis is recognized, the resolution in Di-Chem illustrates the problem of constitutional control.

Cir. 1974), rev'g 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Nichols v. Tower Grover Bank, 497 F.2d
404 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank
of Connecticut, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank,
492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'g Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Bichel Optical Lab., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d
906 (8th Cir. 1973); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Greene v.
First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l
Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super.
1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
11419 U.S. at 608.
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The Court's failure to identify explicitly the factors that determine
appropriate procedural standards is understandable because these
factors can be altered both by the agreement between the parties
and the market relationships that produced the agreement. A possible explanation for the absence of a clear articulation of the requirements of due process is that the Court, unwilling to undertake substantive regulation of the bargaining process, is no longer certain
that the procedural mechanism can be adjusted more accurately by
constitutional adjudication than by legislative delineation of the
state enforcement process.
In order to support the proposition that the default enforcement
process is not readily susceptible to specific constitutional control,
Part II of the article assesses the enforcement costs of the various
procedural requirements identified by the Court as constitutionally
relevant. Because of the consensual nature of the debtor-creditor
relationship and the peculiar context of default, these requirements,
if generally imposed, may well be less justifiable in terms of the
assumed goals of legal procedure than available procedural alternatives that are equally identifiable. An accurate determination of the
impact of specific procedures requires a complex analysis based on
reliable assumptions about the context of a particular dispute. Unless the Court is prepared, therefore, to undertake a continuous
supervision of the debtor-creditor relationship, the state enforcement process should not be closely circumscribed by procedural
requirements of questionable utility.

I.

A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PRIMER-THE DOCTRINE UNFOLDS

A.

Sniadach and Its Progeny Revisisted

Before 1969, the Supreme Court viewed procedural due process as
requiring "where only property rights are concerned, that there be
at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and judicial determination."2 Consequently, the traditional provisional creditor remedies
of pre-judgment attachment and garnishment and statutory replevin involved initial ex parte action by the creditor even though
a temporary deprivation of a debtor's property rights resulted pending judicial resolution of the underlying claim.22 This traditional
21 Ewing

v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
2 See generally McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S.
29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).

814

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 61:807

understanding of the interplay between due process and the deprivation of property rights was an effort to balance the state's interest
in providing machinery by which creditors could quickly and decisively collect their debts2 against the debtor's interest in preventing
a wrongful depreviation of his property rights.
The status of provisional creditor remedies was jarred considerably when the Supreme Court, in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,24 invalidated a Wisconsin pre-judgment garnishment statute
that authorized ex parte seizure of the wages of an allegedly defaulting debtor. The creditor had initiated garnishment proceedings
against the debtor and her employer as garnishee based on an ex
parte allegation of a $420 indebtedness on a promissory note. The
garnishee-employer admitted indebtedness to the debtor for one
week's wages and withheld, pursuant to statute, one-half of the
wages pending court determination of the validity of the claim .2
The Court held that this "interim freezing of wages" without prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard violated procedural due process. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, indicated that
provisional creditor remedies might well meet the requirements of
The balancing approach to procedural due process is reflected in a number of preSniadach Supreme Court decisions. See generally Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. Co. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928).
Under this analysis, due process was viewed as requiring a consideration of "[t]he precise
nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done,
the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed...
the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished." Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This basic conception of due process has been widely followed by the courts. See, e.g.,
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967), where the court said:
[To determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the court
must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and
of the government interest involved ....
Id. at 811.
24 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

2 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969). At the time of the action there were 16 states
with similar statutory schemes. 1 CCH PovERTY LAW REP. 129.751 (1972).
28 The Wisconsin statute permitted the creditor to initiate garnishment proceedings against
any person in possession of his debtor's property. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01 (Supp. 1969). The
statute then required the garnishee-employer to pay over to the debtor a subsistence allowance up to 50% of the wages owing and to retain the remaining property of the debtor until
final adjudication of the claim. Id. §§ 267.04, 267.18(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
In Sniadach,the debtor received notice of the seizure the same day that process was issued;
the statute, however, only required notification of the debtor within 10 days of the garnishment. Id. § 267.07 (Supp. 1969).
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due process in extraordinary situations.2 7 But in the absence of a
special state or creditor interest and a narrowly drawn statute, this
process was unacceptable as applied to wages, "a specialized type
of property presentingdistinctproblems in our economic system. ' 28
Douglas' opinion clearly expressed primary concern over the action
undertaken by the creditor: "a procedural rule that may satisfy due
process for [provisional remedies] in general" may not give
2 395 U.S. at 339. The recognition that summary process might be constitutionally permissible in certain situations permitted the Court to reconcile previous decisions validating
prejudgment deprivations pending judicial adjudication of the controversy. Cafeteria &Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
446
(1951); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Standard Oil Co.
v.
Superior Court, 44 Del. 538, 62 A.2d 454 (1948), appeal dismissed for want of substantial
federal question, 336 U.S. 930 (1949); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Huron
Holding
Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941); Rorick v. Devon Syndicate,
Ltd.,
307 U.S. 299 (1939); Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Phillips
v.
Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Ownbey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921); Clark v. Wells, 203 U.S. 164 (1906); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905);
Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334 (1902); King v. Cross, 175 U.S. 396 (1899); Chicago,
R.I.
& Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308
(1870);
Brashear v. West, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 608, 617-24 (1833).
Three cases cited by the Court as illustrating "extraordinary situations" would seem to
limit a pre-hearing seizure of property to cases requiring the protection of a compelling
governmental interest. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (federal statute authorizing
summary seizure of the assets of a savings and loan association where the operation threatened the interests of creditors, depositors, and the public); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (authorized seizure by a federal Food & Drug administrator
of
"misbranded articles" that were believed dangerous to health, fraudulently
mislabeled, or
materially misleading); Coffin Bros. Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (state statute authorizing state Banking Superintendent to attach failed bank stockholders' property where
an
assessment of 100% stockholder liability had been made in order to uphold public
confidence
in the banking system).
In addition, however, the Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), as an additional illustration of an extraordinary situation sufficient to sanction pre-judgment ex
parte
process. In Ownbey the Court sustained a state statute permitting a court to deny a
nonresident debtor in an attachment proceeding the right to appear unless he posted bond equal
to the value of the attached property. The holding primarily recognized the creditor's
interest
in obtaining security for the satisfaction of debts owed by non-resident debtors. The reference
to Ownbey implicitly recognized that the creditor's interest in collecting debts when ordinary
process was not available or satisfactory could well outweigh the debtor's interest in preventing a temporary deprivation of property rights.
Lower courts following Sniadach generally interpreted this exception as permitting
summary seizure of the assets of a non-resident debtor as a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
even where alternative bases of jurisdiction might have been available. See, e.g.,
Lebowitz
v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1972); Tucker v. Burton, 319
F.
Supp. 567, 569 (D.D.C. 1970). The use of summary seizure to secure jurisdiction
appears,
however, to have been more carefully circumscribed by Fuentes. See note 53 infra.
395 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added).
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"necessary protection to all property in its modern forms.", He
perceived the wage garnishment mechanism as providing the creditor with extraordinary leverage, which might be used to "drive a
wage-earner to the wall," 3 thereby encouraging the debtor to satisfy
an invalid claim merely to secure the return of his wages.'
Douglas' opinion had substantive due process implications: arguably it represented the beginnings of an extension of constitutional
protections to individuals, not on the basis of the property interest
invoked, 32 but rather on the basis of their economic status. While
labeling due process "substantive" or "procedural" often does not
increase analytical precision, 33 constitutional protection of the consumer debtor, who has a significantly inferior status in his relationship with the professional creditor, must be distinguished functionally from the traditional notion of procedural fairness in the enforcement process. The substantive implications of Douglas' opinion
were somewhat obscured by Justice Harlan's concurrence, which
focused not on the unfairness implicit in pre-judgment garnishment
of wages but rather on the deprivation of the use of the debtor's
wages during the period between garnishment and judicial resolution of the underlying claim. 4
The presence of a new kind of substantive protection in procedural due process clothing created understandable confusion as to
395 U.S. at 340.
Id. at 341-42.
, Id. at 341. There is substantial evidence that wage garnishment is used by creditors
less as a collection dervice than as a way to exert leverage, prompting the debtor either to
refinance the obligation or pay the debt. See Note, Wage Garnishmentin Washington-An
Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REv. 743 (1968); Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection
Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 759.
32 Graham, Poverty and Substantive Due Process, 12 ARiz. L. REv. 1 (1970); Note, The
Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for
PersonalLiberty and a "Specialized Type of Property". . .In Our Economic System, 66 Nw.
U. L. REv. 502 (1971). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. at 344 (Black,
J., dissenting).
m The term "substantive due process" is generally used to designate the "economic due
process" cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated state and federal attempts at social
legislation as "impairments of freedom of contract." See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927);
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587 (1936).
395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the appropriate scope of the emerging doctrine. Some courts interpreted Sniadach to require notice and hearing prior to any deprivation of significant property rights,3 5 while others isolated wages from
other kinds of property as deserving extraordinary procedural protection.3 1 Ignored in the process was the possibility that the ultimate
thrust of the decision was not to provide increased procedural protection for a special type of property, but rather was to limit creditor
use of the enforcement process where the imbalance in the debtorcreditor relationship permitted "unconscionable" overreaching. By
imposing additional procedures on a remedy designed to permit
quick and decisive creditor action the effectiveness of the remedy
for the creditor would be largely destroyed; the provisional remedy
would then be indistinguishable from the ordinary process of reducing the claim to judgment and initiating post-judgment garnishment proceedings. The effect of the additional procedural requirements would be judicial abolition of pre-judgment wage garnishment. Admitting the validity of the Court's concern with the abusive potential of pre-judgment wage garnishment, was imposing
these additional procedures on a remedy used to resolve disputes
arising out of consensual transactions an appropriate respose?
If the perspective is shifted from the invalidation of existing statutes to the incorporation of the new constitutional requirements into
an existing statutory scheme of creditor remedies, the problems
posed by Sniadach become more apparent. On the one hand, the
doctrine could be viewed as requiring merely that, prior to any
state-sanctioned deprivation, the debtor be notified of his opportunity to participate in an adjudicatory hearing on the probable validity of the underlying claim. Since most debtors do not appear to
answer claims of default,3 7 creditors could in many cases effect the
deprivation without any adjudication of the dispute. It would seem
See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971)
(attachment of bank account); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d
20 (1969)
(pre-judgment garnishment of accounts receivable).
11See, e.g., People ex rel. Lynch v, Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 910, 464 P.2d 126, 83
Cal.
Rptr. 670 (1970) (general attachment of property; refusal to render an advisory
opinion);
Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (general attachment
of
property); Johnston v. Cunningham, 12 Cal. App. 3d 123, 90 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1970) (attachment of a debtor's prune crop).
" In an empirical study of defaulting debtors in four major urban centers, Professor
Caplovitz found that between 64% (Chicago) and 96% (New York) of the debtors surveyed
failed
to answer their summons, while over 90% of the cases in all cities surveyed terminated
in
default judgments. 2 D. CAPLovrrz, DEBToRs IN DEFAULT 11-35, 11-66 (1971).
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that if a default judgment were the end product of creditor action,
this interpretation of Sniadach would not produce a meaningful
increase in accuracy or protection of the debtor's interest.
On the other hand, Sniadach could be interpreted as requiringa
pre-seizure hearing unless the debtor knowingly and intelligently
waived the hearing. Here the costs of the procedure would be significantly increased: Notice would have to be made meaningful to the
debtor,rs a method would have to be devised to ensure the debtor's
participation at the hearing, 39 and any waiver of the hearing would
need careful regulation." Assuming that such a procedure could be
successfully implemented, this interpretation would be clearly more
consistent with the Court's substantive focus on procedural control
of creditor behavior. It would require, however, constitutional regulation of the consensual relationship between private parties.
In view of the difficulties inherent in incorporating the new requirements into a statutory scheme, post-Sniadachdebate centered
upon the appropriate circumstances under which the additional
procedures would not be required. In Sniadach, the Court indicated
that traditional requirements of due process would still govern in
cases involving extraordinary state or creditor interests where the
statute was narrowly drafted to apply only to such special situations.' Since provisional remedies are generally used only when the
creditor fears loss or destruction of security or the dissipation of
assets prior to judicial resolution of the claim, due process might
then be satisfied merely by redrafting statutes to so confine the use
of these remedies without attempting to incorporate generally prior

11There are indications that a substantial minority of debtors either do not receive notice
of judicial action or fail to understand its meaning. Professor Caplovitz has found that 46%
of debtors surveyed in New York claimed they were never served with process. 2 D. CAPLOviTz,
supra note 30, at 11-7. In addition, of those who were in fact served with process, 15% failed
to answer the summons because they were unaware that they were supposed to appear in
court, that is, "they did not understand the meaning of the summons." Id. at 11-38.
31Attempts to compel appearance through the contempt process would appear merely to
add to the debtor's burden. See generally Alderman, Imprisonment for Debt: Default Judgments, the Contempt Power, and the Effectiveness of Notice Provisionsin the State of New
York, 24 SYmCUSE L. REV. 1217 (1973). Additionally, perhaps debtors ought to be permitted
to purchase a default at the least possible expense should they decide to do so.
" Specific formalities designed to establish an intelligent waiver have been adopted in
criminal waiver cases. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The criminal waiver experience, however, tends to demonstrate that these requirements are largely ritualized formalities
which ultimately fail to accomplish their intended purposes.
1, 395 U.S. at 339.
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notice requirements. The issue as framed for subsequent consideration by the Court posed a choice between a broad incorporation of
prior notice and hearing requirements42 and a narrow limitation of
those requirements to special types of property deserving extraordinary protection. 3
B.

Fuentes v. Shevin: The High Water Mark of ProceduralDue
Process
The question of procedural due process requirements and provisional creditor remedies reappeared before the Court in Fuentes v.
Shevin," in an attack on Florida and Pennsylvania pre-judgment
replevin procedures. 5 Under the statutory scheme in both states,
any creditor who filed an ex parte allegation that his "goods or
chattels are wrongfully detained by any other person or officer"'"
could have a writ of replevin issued directing the sheriff to seize the
disputed goods. 47 There was no statutory provision for notice to the
debtor or for a pre-seizure hearing to determine the validity of the
underlying claim.41
The Court, in finding this statutory scheme constitutionally
defective under Sniadach, responded primarily to the issues as they
had been framed in the interim. First, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, explicitly articulated what had been only implicit
in Sniadach-thatprocedural due process required notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation; 41 a subsequent
judicial determination that reversed the initial taking could not
constitutionally repair the initial wrongful deprivation." Secondly,
42 Deprivation of property rights is here defined along
the lines of Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Sniadach as incorporating the temporary deprivation of
the use of
property. 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring). See cases cited in note 35 supra.
See cases cited in note 36 supra.
" 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Fuentes involved the Florida replevin statutes; its companion case, Parham v.
Cortese,
407 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1972), challenged the Pennsylvania pre-judgment replevin process.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (1964).

47Id.

In Fuentes, the plaintiff purchased consumer goods from the creditor under an
installment sales agreement that granted the seller the right of repossession "in the event
of default
of any payment. . . ." A dispute subsequently arose over the servicing of the purchased
goods
and the debtor stopped payment. In conformance with the Florida statute,
the creditor
obtained a writ of replevin ordering the seizure of the goods by the sheriff pending
a final
judgment in the underlying action. 407 U.S. at 70-71.
," Id. at 80.
51Id. at 82. Although Justice Stewart asserted that the right to a prior hearing was
"no
"1
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the Court rejected the argument that Sniadachprotected only special types of "essential" property interests. 51 Seizing primarily on
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach, Justice Stewart
defined the deprivation that would trigger pre-seizure procedures as
encompassing any temporary deprivation of the use of property
pending final resolution of the underlying claim.5 2 Thirdly, the
Court delimited those circumstances in which the pre-seizure requirements of due process would not be applicable. A justifiable ex
parte seizure could occur only where the state could establish an
important governmental or general public interest,53 where the statnew principle of constitutional law," the cases cited to support this proposition involved
deprivations other than the exercise of provisional creditor remedies upon default. See, e.g.,
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits). The right to a pre-seizure hearing in other
contexts was not, in fact, a new constitutional concept, but in the default context it was
unknown before Sniadach.
11407 U.S. at 88-90. Justice Stewart rejected the argument that Sniadachrepresented an
attempt "to carve out a rule of 'necessity' for the sort of non-final deprivations of property
that [was] involved." Id. at 89.
52 "The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property,' however, has never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather, it has been read broadly
to extend protection to 'any significant property interest.'" Id. at 86.
1 Illustrations of special governmental interests cited by the Court included summary
seizure under the internal revenue statutes, Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); under a
national emergency in times of war, United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921); under an
economic disaster due to bank failure, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 2,47 (1947); see also
Coffin Bros. Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); and in order to protect the public against
misbranded and contaminated foods and drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. 339
U.S. 594 (1950). 407 U.S. at 91-92. Based on this standard the replevin statutes in question
were perceived as reflecting no more than "private gain." Id.
The Court did recognize several situations in which summary seizure would be permissible
even though only the creditor's interest in collecting the obligation was involved. The first
situation was limited to cases where there was immediate danger of destruction of assets. See
note 54 infra. Secondly, the Court recognized the exception, noted in Sniadach, permitting
summary seizure to acquire jurisdiction over a non-resident debtor. See note 27 supra. The
Court indicated, however, that such use of summary process was limited to cases where prejudgment process was "necessary" to secure jurisdiction in state court, citing Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
Several courts following Fuenteshave continued to rely on the Court's reference to Ownbey
in sustaining any pre-judgment seizure of a non-resident debtor to gain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1021 (D. Del. 1972); Gordon
v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420, 423 (Del. Ch. 1972). It has been argued, however, that a fair reading
of Fuentes calls for a limitation on the use of summary attachment of a non-resident debtor
to cases where the seizure was "directly necessary" to secure jurisdiction, and where alternative means of acquiring jurisdiction were not available. See generally Folk & Moyer,
Sequestration in Delaware:A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 762-77 (1973).
At least one court has followed this approach, finding summary seizure unconstitutional
where quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was not necessary to perfect the jurisdiction of the state court.
Welsh v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp. 913 (1975).
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ute was narrowly drawn to protect that interest,54 and where the
exercise of that interest by ex parte seizure was supervised by an
appropriate "state official.""5 Finally, the Court addressed the question of waiver of these due process requirements. The Court perceived the consumer debtor-creditor relationship to involve a fundamental inequality of bargaining power; in Fuentes, this inequality
was exemplified by an adhesion contract with fine print authorization of repossession upon default." Illuminating the substantive
issue lurking in Sniadach, the Court emphasized that any waiver of
predeprivation procedures must be knowingly and intelligently
made. This debtor's status was to be distinguished from that of the
debtor in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,57 in which the Court had
held that a bargained-for confession of judgment clause in a commercial context was not per se violative of procedural due process.
The decision in Fuentes arose out of the same consumer debtor
context as did Sniadach, and reflected the same inclinations to
54The Court emphasized that statutes permitting ex parte seizure must be limited to
special situations demanding prompt action. In the case of replevin this would include only
situations in which the creditor could demonstrate an immediate danger that the goods would
be destroyed or concealed by the debtor. 407 U.S. at 93.
-"The "state official" would be required to participate in the decision to seek a writ, to
review the basis of the underlying claim, and to evaluate the necessity for seizure. Id.
'

Id. at 94-96.

405 U.S. 174 (1972). Overmyer is the clearest articulation of the substantive implications
underlying the imposition of additional due process limitations on provisional creditor remedies. The warrant of attorney clause was executed by the debtor in return for an agreement
by the creditor, inter alia, to extend the date of payment under the original indebtedness, to
reduce the interest rate, and to release various mechanics liens. In rejecting the debtor's due
process claim, the Court unanimously held that the record demonstrated a voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver of "the rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and
hearing. . . ." Id. at 187. In emphasizing the participation of legal counsel and the consideration received in exchange for the waiver, Justice Blackmun indicated that:
Our holding of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of other cases. For
example . ..where there is a great disparity of bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue.
Id. at 188.
This explicit concern for the consumer debtor who is in an inferior market position subject
to overreaching by creditors was reiterated by Justice Blackmun in Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S.
191 (1972), a companion case to Overmyer. In strongly-worded dicta he cautioned that:
In our second concluding comment in Overmyer, we state that the decision is "not
controlling precedent for other facts of other cases," and we refer to contracts of
adhesion, to bargaining power disparity, and to the absence of anything received in
return for a cognovit provision. When factors of this kind are present, we indicate,
"other legal consequences may ensue." That caveat has possible pertinency for
participants in the Pennsylvania system.
405 U.S. at 201.
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extend constitutional protections to the defaulting consumer because of his vulnerable status and inferior market position." But
now the argument assumed that the pre-seizure requirements
could be incorporated into a statutory scheme of creditor remedies.
Consequently, Fuentes contained the first glimmer of recognition
that the implementation of these requirements would require a significant increase in the direct costs of the enforcement process. The
Court responded directly to this issue by asserting that increased
costs are not a sufficient justification for overriding a constitutional
right, and that the onerous burden of such costs in the debtorcreditor context is not a basis for distinguishing this situation from
others in which pre-deprivation protections are deemed essential."
The Court's unwillingness to balance the utility of preseizure
hearing requirements against increased litigation costs can be best
explained in terms of the underlying premise of both Sniadach and
Fuentes. The primary concern was to regulate creditor behavior in
a context where ordinary assumptions about the utility of the bargaining process were presumptively invalid; the imposition of preseizure procedural safeguards was assumed to establish a balance

I This substantive concern with consumer debtors as a class is best reflected in Fuentes,
where the Court, in denying that the statutory requirements of an initiating bond by the
creditor, allegations of entitlement, and possible damage liability are adequate protections
against error, states:
For if an applicant for the writ knows that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with little access to legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures, there may be a substantial possibility that a summary seizure of property-however unwarranted-may go unchallenged, and the applicant may feel that
he can act with impunity.

407 U.S. 67, 83 n.13 (1972).
11Id. at 92 n.29.
Justice Stewart in Fuentes remained singularly unimpressed with arguments directed toward the decreased "efficiency" of the additional procedural requirements:
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all
possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose
possessions are about to be taken.
Id. at 90 n.22.
Indeed, while the Court has recognized the possible relevancy of questions of "efficiency"
in constitutional adjudication, it has emphasized that such values must give way to "higher
values." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
It is submitted, however, that efficiency has been given a pejorative connotation by the
Court because the term has been used only to signify a reduction in the direct costs of
enforcement. If, however, the question is posed in terms of "economic efficiency," which
calculates total enforcement costs as an attempt at value maximizing, the analysis should
be relevant and enlightening.
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in the debtor-creditor relationship absent due to market inequalities
that precluded a fairly bargained-for agreement on default procedures. Uncertainty as to the full implications of this assumption
perhaps best explains the Fuentes Court's failure to adopt the
"compulsory hearing" interpretation of the Sniadachrequirements.
Although much of the Fuentes opinion focused on the need for
debtor participation in a hearing as the essential test of the validity
of the deprivation,60 the Court indicated that the constitutional
right was limited to "an opportunityto be heard."'" Then, implicitly
recognizing the potentially limited effect such a requirement could
have in reducing the probability of error, the Court stated:
Since the issues and facts decisive of rights in repossession suits may
very often be quite simple, there is a likelihood that many defendants
would forgo their opportunity sensing the futility of the exercise in
the particular case. And, of course, no hearing need be held unless
the defendant, having received notice of the opportunity, takes advantage of it.6"
The significance of the probability that few debtors would exercise their right to a pre-seizure hearing opportunity was recognized
by Mr. Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Fuentes. He asserted that although "[t]he Court's rhetoric is seductive . . . in
end analysis, the result it reaches will have little impact and represents no more than ideological tinkering with state law."'" Even if
prior notice and hearing requirements were implemented as prescribed in Fuentes, the creditor "need only give a few days notice
of a hearing, take possession if hearing is waived or if there is default; and if hearing is necessary merely establish probable cause for
asserting that default has occurred."" Based on this analysis,
Justice White concluded that there was significant doubt that the
pre-seizure requirements would meaningfully increase the protection provided to the debtor under present law."
Although an evaluation of this perception requires a more precise
analysis of the enforcement costs of these standards, the debate over
costs was a significant recognition of their relevance to a determinasoSee, e.g., 407 U.S. at 96.
61Id. at 92 n.29.
62 Id.

03407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
64 Id.

65Id.
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tion of the appropriate extent of constitutional regulation. The issue
remained unresolved, however, and the legislative response to
Fuentes centered primarily on the effort to redraft statutes governing ex parte creditor remedies to fit within the narrow exemption
recognized by the Court. 6
C. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: A Retreat from Fuentes?
This legislative response to Fuentes was, perhaps, predictable
because of two factors: 1) the Court had left a narrow opening
through which carefully drafted statutes might constitutionally
pass;"7 and 2) the absence of any accurate calculation of enforcement costs left most legislatures unsure of the economic effect of
actually implementing the additional procedural requirements.
It was therefore inevitable that the issue would return to the
Court framed in terms of the first factor. 8 In considering a challenge
to the constitutionality of the Louisiana sequestration procedure,"1
the Court elected to consider what kinds of statutes would be sufficiently circumscribed to permit ex parte process. In Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant Co. 71 the creditor, alleging default on a credit sale of
consumer goods in which he claimed a vendor's lien, filed an ex
parte petition for a writ of sequestration.71 Without notice to the

asSee, e.g., the Virginia Detinue Statute, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 to -593 (1974 Cum.
Supp.). Following an opinion by the Virginia Attorney General that Virginia's statutory
repossession procedure was unconstitutional in light of Fuentes, the Virginia legislature
amended the statute by: 1) requiring the ex parte process to be preceded by an application
by the creditor presented to a judicial officer and by the presentation of evidence of the kind
and value of the property; that the property would be sold, secreted, or materially damaged
or destroyed; and that the creditor's claim of settlement had a substantial basis; and 2)
specifically providing for a prompt post-seizure hearing either within 21 days of the issuance
of process or earlier, upon application of either party. Id. at §§ 8-586; 8-591.
These changes were obviously designed to bring the statute within the exceptions to the
Fuentes pre-seizure requirements by narrowing its applicability to cases involving a special
creditor interest in prompt action, by requiring review,of the application by a judicial officer
instead of the court clerk, and by creating a statutorily explicit access to a prompt postseizure hearing.
'1 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972).
61See, e.g., Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972); Sena v. Montoya,
346 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972); Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.
Wis. 1972); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 1972) petitionfor cert. dismissed
410 U.S. 919 (1973); Inter City Motor Sales v. Szymanski, 42 Mich. App. 112, 201 N.W.2d
378 (1972); Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3501-3576 (1964).
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
7, Id. at 601-02.
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debtor or an opportunity for a prior hearing, the writ was issued by
a parish judge" upon the creditor's stipulated bond 73 and an affidavit alleging default, the existence of the creditor's lien, and a belief
that the debtor would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of
the merchandise . . . during the pendency of these proceedings. . . -71 After the constable had seized the goods, 75 the debtor
filed a motion to dissolve the writ asserting, inter alia, that the
failure of the Louisiana procedure to provide prior notice and hearing opportunities violated due process. 7
In affirming the Louisiana Supreme Court decision sustaining the
writ,77 the Court rejected the debtor's due process claim, holding
that the Louisiana system, by minimizing the risk of error and limiting the sequestration process to a narrow range of special creditor
interests, was constitutional even without a provision for pre-seizure
participation by the debtor. 7 The retreat from Fuentes was preceded by a rehabilitation of the traditional pre-Sniadach due process concept that "where only property rights are involved mere
postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process,
if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination is adequate." Justice White, now writing for the majority, found in the
Louisiana procedures sufficient bases for distinction from the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes held defective in Fuentes. It was
determinative in his judgment that: 1) the Louisiana procedure
limited the right to an ex parte seizure to situations in which the
debtor had the power to conceal, dispose of, or destroy the property
pending resolution of the dispute, thereby limiting the factual issues
to those of default and the existence of the creditor's lien;"o 2) the
" The Louisiana Code provides generally that the court clerk may issue a writ ofsequestration, but art. 281 limits the power to issue writs in Orleans Parish, where the issue arose,
to
a judge. LA. CODE CIv. PRo. arts. 281-83 (1964).
1 LA. CODE Civ. PRO. arts. 3501, 3574 (1964). The creditor was required to furnish double
bond in the amount of $1,125.
7, LA. CODE Civ. PRO. art. 3571 (1964). The statute requires only an allegation that
the
debtor has the power to conceal, dispose or waste the property, etc.

,' LA. CODE CIv. Pao. art. 3504 (1964).

" The trial court ruled that the provisional
seizure was not a denial of due process and the
debtor appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 416 U.S. at 603.
77269 So. 2d 186 (1972), cert. granted,411 U.S. 981 (1973).
78416 U.S. at 618-19.
" 416 U.S. at 611.
"Id. at 614. In his dissent Justice Stewart disputed the existence of this distinction.
In
both cases he contended that the factual issues were the same: default by the debtor
and the
existence of the creditor's security interest in the property. 416 U.S. at 633.

826

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 61:807

writ of sequestration could not issue upon conclusory allegations of
entitlement, but required additional factual allegations to support
the grounds relied upon;' 3) the factual showing was made to a
judicial officer, rather than a clerk, and the writ could issue only
upon his authorization; s" and 4) the debtor was entitled under the
statute to an immediate post-seizure hearing and could secure possession of the goods even prior to such adjudication by posting an
appropriate bond. Considering these distinctions in light of the
significant interests of both parties in the property in question 4 and
the increased risks to the creditor's interest where pre-seizure notification was provided to the debtor,' the Court concluded that this
statutory procedure "effects a constitutional accommodation of the
conflicting interests of the parties.""
Since Fuentes purported to limit ex parte seizure to circumstances involving an overriding governmental or general public interest,
Justice White's effort to distinguish Fuentes is not particularly
416 U.S. at 617-18. Article 3501 of the Louisiana Code provides that:
A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the nature of the claim
and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the
writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition verified by . . . the
petitioner ...
LA. CODE Civ. PRO. art. 3501 (1964).
Justice Stewart challenged the probative value of requiring additional information on a
standardized form affidavit and contended that these pro forma allegations were insufficient
substitutes for a pre-seizure adversary proceeding. 416 U.S. at 631-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 616. Justice Stewart argued that the participation of a judicial officer was constitutionally irrelevant, since the nature of the duty remained essentially the same whether performed by a judge or a clerk. Id. at 632 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 618. Article 3506 of the Louisiana Code permits the defendant by contradictory
motion to obtain the dissolution of a writ of attachment.
U Under Louisiana law the installment seller has a vendor's lien to secure the unpaid
balance of the purchase price. The existence of the lien made the debtor's property interest
subject to defeasance upon default, his interest being limited to the surplus remaining after
a foreclosure and sale of the property. LA. CODE CiV. PRo. art. 2373 (1964).
" Under Louisiana law the creditor's lien on the property expires if the buyer transfers
possession. Thus, Justice White contended, pre-seizure notice creates additional risks that
the property will be conveyed prior to sequestration to third parties whose interests will be
superior to the lien. 416 U.S. at 608-09.
A more limited analogy can be found in other jurisdictions where the creditor takes a
security interest in consumer goods under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under
UCC § 9-307(2) this interest is inferior to that of good faith buyers of such goods from the
debtor if their purchase is for personal use, unless the creditor files a financing statement with
respect to the goods.
m 416 U.S. at 607.
"
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persuasive.17 The opinion does, however, raise some of the previously neglected but important questions about the ultimate effect
on the enforcement process of imposing additional procedural requirements. Although the factual context here was once more the
consumer debtor-creditor relationship, the Court used the peculiar
status of the debtor in Sniadach as a means of limiting the thrust
of that decision."' Sniadach was seen as representing a particular
need to control the overreaching creditor where the summary remedy affected the most vulnerable aspect of the consumer debtor's
market position-his dependency upon current earnings.89 The need
to protect the debtor's status was not so great where the deprivation
involved the assertion of a creditor's security interest and was accompanied by additional controls on the creditor's use of the remedy." The Court apparently assumed that in this latter situation
creditor leverage was diminished. In addition, where Fuentes posed
the constitutional issue in terms of the fact of deprivation, without
regard to the specific remedy invoked by the creditor, Mitchell recognized a possible distinction between the provisional remedy of
pre-judgment garnishment (or attachment) and that of statutory
repossession ' based on the repossessing creditor's significant present interest in the property subject to seizure. Where the remedy
sought is statutory replevin, the creditor's interest in the property
decreases in value in the case of default and continued possession
and use by the debtor.2 Furthermore, pre-seizure notice makes possible a transfer by the debtor in advance of repossession that could
5,Fuentes limited these exceptional circumstances to cases involving broad governmental
interests as opposed to the "private gain" represented by the replevin statutes. See note 53
supra and accompanying text. The majority opinion in Mitchell generated heated controversy
among various members of the Court. In the opinion of Justice Powell, concurring in Mitchell,
"The Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of [Fuentes], and
to this extent I think it is fair to say that the Fuentesopinion is overruled. Id. at 623 (Powell
J., concurring). Justice Stewart, in dissent, was of the same opinion: "this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin. . . ." Id. at 634. In strongly worded language, he expressed his concern that the Court in Mitchell was overruling an established
decision that was barely two years old. The only change that he could perceive to explain
the reversal was in the composition of the Court (Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not
participate in the 4-3 decision in Fuentes). Id. at 635. See Blackmun, J., dissenting in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 614 (1975).
" See generally 416 U.S. at 614.
9IId.
90Id.

, Id. at 604-05, 615.
92

Id. at 604.
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subordinate the creditor's security interest to the rights of the transferee or other creditors. 3 The implicit question is whether the creditor's right to pursue remedies upon default is made more costly by
prior notice and hearing where he asserts an existing property interest than where he seeks to secure assets in which he has no prior
interest. 4
In Mitchell, the Court clearly began to come to terms with the
total costs of enforcement generated by the constitutional adjustment of default procedures, and its significant retreat from the
Fuentes standards can be explained most rationally in terms of an
implicit recognition, based upon a rudimentary cost analysis, that
the Fuentes doctrine would significantly increase enforcement
costs. 5 The apparent conclusion was that the increased costs of preseizure proceedings, particularly where the creditor's security interest was imperiled, would produce only a minimal reduction in the
cost of error. First, the probability of error was already low because
the statutory procedure in Louisiana significantly limited, in the
Court's judgment, the factual context of the dispute to the issues
of default and the existence of the creditor's security interest in the
property. The assumption was made, probably correctly, that an
uncomplicated factual determination created a higher probability
that the ex parte action by the creditor would ultimately be sustained, and consequently that a pre-seizure hearing would not result
in a significant reduction in the incidence of error. Secondly, the
impact of error had been minimized by the statutory provision for
an immediate post-seizure hearing upon the debtor's application,
thereby reducing the cost of delay to the debtor. 8 Although Mitchell
did not attempt to frame the cost calculation in precise terms, the
Court clearly concluded that, under the Louisiana sequestration
Id. at 608-09.
See notes 209-13 infra and accompanying text. One of the questions certified by the
Supreme Court in granting review of Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), was whether an ex parte attachment statute satisfies due process "to extent
it permits attachment of property in which plaintiff does not have a vendor's lien or similar
statutory lien." Curtis Circulation Co. v Sugar, No. 74-859, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545, 3546 (April
15, 1975).
416 U.S. at 607-08.
" Id.
at 609-10. It should be noted that, as Justice Stewart indicates in dissent, this same
limited factual context is a feature common to all ex parte repossession procedures. Id. at
633.
See notes 124-33 infra and accompanying text.
,416 U.S. at 610.
"
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procedure, the presumed increase in direct costs resulting from the
imposition of broadly conceived pre-seizure procedures was not warranted by the perceived reduction in error.
Mitchell is important because it reflects a significant shift in the
Court's perception of the objective of constitutional control. Both
Sniadach and Fuentes represent an attempt to regulate creditor
overreaching in realizing a "private gain" upon default.9 In this
context the mandates of due process are determined by balancing
the interests of a creditor in securing the debtor's property against
the interest of a debtor in preventing unjustified deprivations of his
property. Implicit is the recognition that since the debtor-creditor
relationship is essentially consensual, effective regulation where the
creditor has a dominant market position requires supervision of the
bargaining process. In Mitchell, however, the object of constitutional regulation is no longer the overreaching creditor, but rather
the state enforcement mechanism that provides a procedure for the
resolution of debtor-creditor disputes. The determination of due
process standards on this basis requires balancing the debtor's interest against the interest of the state in providing an efficient mechanism for resolving disputes between private parties. This return to
the pre-Sniadachview of due process-focusing on state procedures
rather than creditor behavior-eliminates the necessity of a substantive regulation of the agreement between the parties.
Although returning to a more traditional formulation of the affected interests subject to constitutional regulation, Mitchell emphasizes, and thereby identifies as constitutionally relevant, specific provisions of the Louisiana procedure which are not common
to all state procedures governing provisional creditor remedies. Simply stated, Mitchell permits ex parte seizure upon default if the
statutory remedy requires: 1) participation by a judicial officer; 2)
additional factual allegations of entitlement; and 3) opportunity for
an immediate post-seizure hearing. As indicated by Justice Stewart's dissent, it can be argued that these provisions have no measurable impact in increasing the probability of a correct ex parte determination' 9 even accepting the balance as the majority frames it,
the question remains whether these requirements, when constitutionally imposed, promote more effectively the assumed fundamental goals of legal procedure. 0 '
11Fuentes
'o

v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 92.
416 U.S. at 631-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See notes 197-206 infra and accompanying text.
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The Mitchell response to this question was obscured by the
Court's failure to articulate more precisely the constitutional standard that had emerged. Was the Sniadach-Fuentesbroad standard
of pre-seizure notice and hearing destined for an early grave? Surprisingly, as Justice Stewart was to remark, "the report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin.

.

.seems to have been greatly exagger-

ated." 02
D. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.:
Fuentes and Mitchell Recycled
Because Mitchell failed to distinguish Fuentes adequately or to
overrule it expressly, it was followed by numerous challenges to
other statutory provisional creditor remedies based upon alleged
failures to provide the kinds of statutory protections deemed sufficient by the Court to justify an ex parte seizuure.0 3 It was barely
eight months before the issue came to the Supreme Court once again
for clarification. In a somewhat surprising opinion"0 4 the Court in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. held the Georgia
pre-judgment garnishment statute unconstitutional as a violation of
procedural due process."0 5
In Di-Chem, the creditor filed suit against a commercial debtor
alleging an indebtedness of $51,000, and simultaneously filed an
affidavit and bond for pre-judgment garnishment of the debtor's
bank account.0 6 Based on the affidavit asserting the indebtedness
and the creditor's "reason to apprehend the loss of said sum...
unless garnishment process issues," the court clerk issued a summons in garnishment to the debtor's bank."' The debtor responded
by filing a forthcoming bond discharging the garnishee and a motion
112North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
,13
See, e.g., Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New York
attachment law permitting ex parte seizure without adequate post-seizure hearing violates
due process); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (Texas sequestration
statute that provided neither prior notice and hearing nor judicial supervision and immediate
post-seizure hearing violates due process); Roberts v. MacCaulay, 232 Ga. 660, 208 S.E.2d
478 (1974) (state possessory warrant proceedings under statute compelling production of
property without prior notice and opportunity to be heard violates due process).
'1 The transformation of the 4-3 majority in Fuentes to a 5-4 minority in Mitchell had led
to the assumption that the Court was willing to recognize significant limitations on the
application of the pre-seizure notice and hearing standards of Fuentes.
,OS
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
, GA. CODE ANN.§§ 46-01-102 (1974).
'0 GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974).
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to dismiss the garnishment and discharge the bond asserting, inter
alia, that the statutory procedure violated due process.108
The Georgia Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Sniadach as
creating protection for wages as a special type of property and therefore judged it inapplicable to pre-judgment garnishment of other
assets of a debtor." 9 The Supreme Court reversed, reasserting that
Fuentes made Sniadach applicable to a temporary deprivation of
any significant property right. While the length and severity of the
taking might bear on the nature of the hearing, these factors were
not determinative of the right to the pre-seizure hearing itself.'
With the revival of Fuentes as a broad standard requiring preseizure notice and hearing opportunities, the Georgia garnishment
statute failed its constitutional test. Nor could the statute be saved
by Mitchell, which the Di-Chem Court seemed to view as an exception to the application of the Fuentes rules. Unlike the Louisiana
procedure, the Georgia statutory scheme required neither judicial
participation nor specific factual allegations of entitlement, nor a
prompt post-seizure hearing.
The major contention of the creditor was based on the,substantive
issue underlying the previous cases, which was posed correctly and
directly to the Court for the first time.' Did not Sniadach,Fuentes,
and Mitchell reflect a constitutional protection of the consumer
debtor's status-not his property rights per se-in cases where unequal market positions permitted creditor overreaching? If so, the
extraordinary pre-seizure protections should not apply to a transaction between commercial parties of equal bargaining power. Forced
to confront the question, the Court apparently concluded that a
substantive notion of "constitutional unconscionability" could not
be supported. Although recognizing that distinctions based on the
status of the debtor might well reduce the impact of error, the Court
held that even in the absence of the consumer debtor status the
impact of an erroneous taking was sufficiently great "that some
,01
The only statutory provision permitting dissolution of the garnishment before final
adjudication required the defendant to file a bond, payable to the creditor, conditioned on
the payment of any judgment rendered on the creditor's claim. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-401
(1974).
' 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E.2d 321 (1973).
£10 419 U.S. at 606.
1 Id. at 607. "Respondent also argues that neither Fuentes nor Mitchell is appropriate here
because those cases dealt with the application of due process protections to consumers who
are victims of contracts of adhesion. . . ." Id. at 723.
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procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error. 1 1 2
The immediate reaction to this latest foray into the state enforcement process is that Fuentes, used by the Court to rebut the contention that Sniadach applied only to a specialized property interest,
is alive and well. That Fuentes lives is probably true, but its health
is subject to serious doubt. As indicated by Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion, Di-Chem might be viewed as a retreat from
Mitchell, which had rehabilitated the traditional view that an adequate post-seizure determination was the test of due process as
applied to deprivations of property interests."' But the Court has
also abandoned the substantive thrust of Sniadach-thatdue process could provide constitutional control over the exercise of provisional creditor remedies against a consumer debtor-abandonment
related to the alteration in Mitchell of the equation of interests by
which the requirements of due process are measured. Because the
focus has shifted from the creditor's private interest to the interest of the state in resolving disputes between private parties,
regulation of the consumer debtor-creditor relationship to prevent
"unconscionable overreaching" is no longer as relevant to the constitutional question. Consequently, the Court apparently adopted
in Di-Chem the proposition that due process limitations on
creditor remedies, regardless of the context, embrace only procedural fairness."' In so doing, it would seem logically to follow that
the extent and specific nature of the procedures that are constitutionally imposed on the enforcement mechanism should bear some
relationship to their effect in increasing the accuracy of the deprivation or in reducing the impact should error result."'
It can be assumed that the Fuentes standard is the consequence
of the states' failure to circumscribe ex parte remedies sufficiently.
The questions remain: What is required? When is it required? Are
the requirements justifiable?
The only possible consistent reading of the cases requires a choice
between: 1) pre-seizure notice and hearing opportunities based on
Fuentes; or 2) ex parte process requiring participation by a judicial
Id. at 608.
Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring). In Mitchell the Court revived the traditional notion
that where property rights were concerned, procedural due process requirements were limited
to an adequate hearing at some point in the process. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4675, citing Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
,,419 U.S. at 608.
",See notes 164-69 infra and accompanying text.
112
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officer, specific factual allegations of entitlement, and access to an
"immediate" post-seizure hearing. This standard is apparently
imposed on the exercise of any provisional creditor remedy. Although the Court in Mitchell recognized potential cost distinctions
among the various remedies, the potentially lower direct costs of
additional procedures in the garnishment setting was not a factor
in invalidating the Georgia statute in Di-Chem."' The question of
justification remains, but the Court's apparent hesitancy to articulate clearly its procedural standards may reflect a growing awareness that, due to the complexity of the analysis, consitutionally
imposed procedures may not be the appropriate vehicle for providing an efficient dispute resolution mechanism." 7 The clearest call
for a cost analysis of procedural due process comes from Justice
Powell:
[The recent expansion of concepts of procedural due process requires a more careful assessment of the nature of the governmental
function served by the challenged procedure and of the costs the
procedure exacts of private interests.'
E.

Toward a More RationalAnalysis of ProceduralDue Process

The path from Sniadach to Di-Chem is circular. The notion of
substantive protection of consumer default that colored so much of
the Sniadach redefinition of procedural due process appears largely
to have disappeared. Gone with it is any serious thought that state
enforcement procedures will be widely amended to implement the
prior notice and hearing opportunities that Sniadach enunciated.'
M The

distinction between pre-judgment garnishment and pre-judgment replevin did not

escape Mr. Justice Powell, who viewed the Fuentes standard as particularly inappropriate
"in cases where the creditor's interest in the property may be as significant or even greater
than that of the debtor." 419 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
"I See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, 419 U.S. at 614; and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, 419 U.S. at 609, 610-11.
228 419 U.S. at 610.
I There have been some legislative efforts to incorporate pre-seizure requirements into
pre-judgment remedy procedures. See, e.g., CoN. Pus. Aar. No. 73-431 (1973). The Connecticut statute generally requires pre-seizure notice and hearing opportunities in all "consumer
transactions" (§§ 2 and 3). Section 5 permits ex parte seizure by court order in a consumer
transaction upon the creditor's affidavit that the debtor is a non-resident, or that there is a

reasonable likelihood that the debtor will remove himself or his property, or dispose or seques-

ter his property. The debtor is given the right to challenge the order at a post-seizure hearing.

Section 6 permits ex parte seizure without notice in a commercial transaction where the
debtor has waived his rights under the act.
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This is not surprising, since it was implicit in Sniadach that such
procedures were fundamentally inconsistent with the basic purpose
of provisional creditor remedies."' 0 As a result, however, the range
of permissible ex parte processes, which Sniadachand Fuentes conceived as a narrow class of exceptional cases, now appears to form
the statutory universe against which the mandates of due process
must be measured.
In terms of the balance between the competing interests of the
debtor and the state enforcement mechanism, the Court has returned to the pre-Sniadachprinciple that the fundamental requirement of due process is an adequate opportunity for an adjudication
of the underlying claim at an appropriate point in the enforcement
process.' 2 ' The Court is now trying to refine the meaning of that
traditional understanding: When must the hearing be held to be
meaningful and "adequate"? What controls must be placed on the
creditor's access to ex parte process? -The Court has acknowledged
that the resolution of these questions requires a precise balancing
of the particular interests present in a given debtor-creditor dispute.'2 Consequently, the requirements of due process may well
vary depending on the existence of a number of variables which
affect the cost-benefit calculation of a particular procedural standard.
The difficulty with precisely defining procedures to govern the
exercise of provisional creditor remedies lies partly in the consensual
nature of the transaction that produces the dispute-many of the
variables affecting enforcement costs are either dependent upon the
agreement between the parties or the relationship that produced the
agreement.12 Accurate determination of the appropriate procedures
requires a complex analysis based on reliable assumptions about the
nature of the debtor-creditor relationship and the context of default,
assumptions that may well be altered by the agreement and the
bargaining process. But once the attempt to regulate the bargaining
"2

See notes 36-37 supra and accompanyipg text.

2, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 609, 609-10 (1975) (Powell, J.,

concurring).
,,2 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974).
- Illustrations abound of the ways in which the agreement between the parties can alter
the factual context of the dispute. For example, has the debtor agreed to permit the creditor
to utilize ex parte process upon default? Has the creditor been granted an interest in the
debtor's property? Has the debtor agreed not to assert claims and defenses upon default?
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process is abandoned, the efficacy of defining additional constitutionally imposed procedures in order to reduce the total costs of
enforcement is subject to considerable question. The decision in DiChem seems to recognize implicitly that the constitutional necessity
for additional procedures should be determined only after a rational
inquiry into the probability that the enforcement process will benefit by their inclusion. As a first step in that direction, the second
part of this article proposes a model identifying the factors necessary to calculate the cost of procedural due process, and analyzes
these Court-imposed procedures to determine whether, in fact, the
enforcement process benefits from these additional procedures.
II.

THE COST OF PROCEDURAL DuE PROCESS

An efficiency analysis of procedural due process requirements presupposes the ability both to identify and to measure the social values represented by legal procedures. Assuming that a primary goal
of procedure is to produce accurate dispute resolution, it is possible
to pose the constitutional question in efficiency terms: Are the direct costs of the additional procedures greater than the resulting
reduction in error costs? And if such an imbalance exists, should it
influence the Court's determination of the procedures required by
due process?
Arguably, however, legal procedures have intrinsic worth.' 24 Apart
from reducing the risk of error, a trial-type adjudication may express social values such as fairness, dignity, and increased civility
in the debtor-creditor relationship.'2 Even though additional default procedures increase total enforcement costs, they may reduce
the social cost of default by providing an appearance of fairness,
even if a deprivation is ultimately sustained. It seems equally plausible, however, that additional procedures that do not reduce the
cost of error will be perceived as costly formalities that merely increase the burden on the defaulting debtor. On this basis, additional
procedures which are primarily cosmetic would diminish rather
than enhance the desired social values.
These conflicting assumptions about the intrinsic worth of default
124See

generally Summers, A Critiqueof ProfessorFried'sAnatomy of Values, 56 CORNELL

L. REv. 598, 620-23 (1971).
' Id. at 620-22. See generally Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized
Repossession:A Critiquefor ProfessorJohnson, and a PartialReply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 116,
147-49 (1973).
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procedures cannot readily be empirically verified. The only remaining measure, therefore, of the value of procedural due process requirements is their impact on accurate dispute resolution.
A.

The Debtor-CreditorRelationship and the Context of Default
In order to predict whether specific procedural requirements promote efficient dispute resolution, it is initially necessary to evaluate
in the context of the dispute those factors that determine the costs
of enforcement. It may also be socially important to attempt to
determine how any additional costs will be distributed. The incidence of enforcement costs, however, is not strictly relevant to an
efficiency analysis. 12 The present inquiry is concerned with measuring the magnitude of the social costs of using particular enforcement
techniques, not with where the costs will ultimately fall. In any
event, absent more precise empirical information concerning the
extent to which suppliers of credit can absorb or pass on increased
costs, the incidence of enforcement costs upon default must be considered indeterminate.' 2 The following questions, however, are cru'2 There may be circumstances in which the incidence of enforcement costs will affect their
measurement. For example, even assuming that costs are spread on a per contract basis, the
impact of such costs may nonetheless fall most significantly on the high-risk debtor. To the
extent that increased costs increase the total price of credit, on the margin it would appear
to increase the incidence of default. At some point a marginal increase in enforcement costs
will cause a marginal debtor to default because of inability to meet the increased price of
credit. Where his default is not premised on a defense to the underlying obligation, the
probabilities of error for him in the enforcement process will not have been significantly
reduced by additional enforcement procedures.
12?The principal systematic attempt to predict the incidence of increased enforcement
costs in the context of default is Professor Johnson's study of automobile repossession in
California. See generally Johnson, Denialof Self-Help Repossession:An Economic Analysis,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 82, 107-13 (1973). Johnson, after assuming that the credit industry is not
characterized by monopolistic profits, concludes that increased enforcement costs will fall
primarily on low income, high risk consumers. His data supports a model in which most of
the increased costs are neither absorbed by the suppliers of credit nor borne by defaulting
debtors. Rather, the costs either are passed on by the creditor through increased finance rates
or the creditor attempts to reduce litigation costs by increasing down-payments or undertaking more selective extensions of credit to eliminate potential defaulters. It is not clear, however, even assuming that increased costs are not absorbed in part by the creditor, that either
of these responses will necessarily mean that the incidence of increased costs is regressive.
See Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 125, at 131-37. Professors Dauer and Gilhool challenge (1)
the assumption that a significant proportion of increased costs will not be absorbed by the
credit industry; and (2) the assumption that those costs that are passed on to credit users
will not be equally distributed on a per contract basis to all credit users. Id. For Professor
Johnson's reply to these criticisms, see Johnson, A Response to Dauerand Gilhool: A Defense
of Self-Help Repossession, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1973).
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cial to an evaluation of enforcement costs:
(1) To what extent do claims of default raise complex factual
issues susceptible of accurate resolution?
(2) To what extent do informal controls reduce the probability
of erroneous claims?
(3) To what extent do debtors with valid defenses oppose claims
of default through the adjudicatory process?
Although empirical data on these questions are at best incomplete,
some basic assumptions structure the context in which provisional
creditor remedies are used.
1.

The Complexity of the Factual Questions Requiring Resolution

An adjudicatory proceeding will more effectively reduce the risk
of error where the factual issues are complex and are capable of
accurate resolution." 8 Both pre-judgment attachment (or garnishWhether those costs not absorbed by the suppliers of credit are distributed equally on a
per contract basis are borne primarily by debtors who default, or fall disproportionately on a
class of marginal consumers, depends upon a number of factors including: (1) the extent to
which marginal consumers are less sensitive to increases in either the price of credit or the
cash price of goods and services; (2) the ability of creditors to recoup additional costs by
deficiency suits against defaulting debtors; and (3) the relationship between adjustment in
contract terms through increased down-payments and subsequent collection efforts. On the
question of consumer sensitivity to price, see generally D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE:
CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME FAMILiEs, chs. 5-6 (Free Press ed. 1967); FEDERAL TRADE
CoMMSIioN, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDr & RETAm SALES PRAcnCEs OF DiSm=ICT
OF COLUMBiA RErTMLERs (1968); White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates:An
Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (1971). The
question of cost recovery through deficiency suits is discussed in Johnson, Creditors' Remedies and Rate Ceilings, 26 PERs. FIN. L. Q. REP. 64 (1972); but see Shuchman, Profit on
Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 42
(1969). Concerning the relationship between down-payments and the degree of collection
difficulty, see G. MooRE AND P. KLEN, Ti QunrrY OF CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CRErr 82
(1967).
M It should be noted, however, that merely because the factual issues in a given dispute
are complex and theoretically subject to accurate determinations, it does not necessarily
follow that a trial-type adjudication is an efficient means of ensuring the accuracy of the
resolution. See generally Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:Some Theoretical
and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNEL L. REv. 772 (1974), in which it is argued that the
nature and method of operation of social welfare programs limit the presumed effectiveness
of trial-type adjudication in assuring accurate resolution of social welfare claims. Id. at 81115. The only assumption made in this discussion is that an adjudicatory proceeding will have
a greater impact in reducing erroneous claims where the dispute presents complex factual
questions which are capable of accurate resolution than where the factual questions are
straightforward or not susceptible of accurate determination.
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ment) and statutory replevin generally require that the creditor
establish (1) the existence of the obligation, and (2) grounds for
invoking the pre-judgment seizure. 129 The factual inquiries will generally be limited to non-payment and perceived difficulty in satisfying the obligation. These limitations result primarily from the substantive contours of the debtor-creditor relationship.
Where the debtor's obligation is unsecured, the creditor will generally have required the execution of a negotiable promissory note.
As the holder of a negotiable instrument, the creditor prima facie
establishes the obligation merely by producing the instrument. 3 "
The issue will then be limited to the question of payment on the
note unless the debtor can establish a defense to the underlying
obligation.' 3 '
Yet this opportunity to raise a defense may prove illusory. Where
the obligation arises from a loan, underlying defenses will generally
be limited to usury or the creditor's failure to comply with federal
disclosure requirements. Neither usually justifies non-payment;
thus the debtor's ability to assert these claims affirmatively may not
prevent the deprivation. 3 2 The creditor may be the purchaser of an
"ISee, e.g., the Virginia pre-judgment attachment statute, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-519 to 8577 (1974 Cum. Supp.), and the Virginia Detinue Statute, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 to 8-595
(1974 Cum. Supp.).
Under § 8-519 the right to sue out an attachment is granted to any person with a claim to
any debt in excess of $20.00 who can allege one of the specified grounds for attachment as
provided in § 8-520. In addition to non-residency, the grounds for attachment are limited to
removal, conversion, disposal or concealment by the debtor of his property.
In the case of an action in detinue (the equivalent of statutory replevin) § 8-586 permits
an ex parteseizure of specific property of the debtor where the creditor can establish (1) that
his claim of entitlement has a substantial basis and (2) that the property will be sold,
removed, secreted, destroyed or damaged if possession is permitted to remain in the debtor.
.. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
"3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 3-301, 3-307, 3-802.
§§ 3-306, 3-307.

232 Only about 20% of the state statutes governing usury provide that the contract is void
or permit a set-off against principal for violations of the interest limitation. See, e.g., 1 P-H

CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT; INSTALLMENT SALES

15,902-15,961. In most jurisdictions

the penalty for usury is limited to forfeiture of interest due on the obligation, which will not
in itself operate as a defense to non-payment.
Under the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970), the
creditor is required to disclose the terms and conditions of the credit extension, including the
rate of interest, at the time the obligation is incurred. Violations of the disclosure provisions
merely grant to the debtor the right to recover affirmative damages against the creditor equal
to twice the amount of the finance charge, not to exceed $1000, together with costs and
attorneys fees in a successful action. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970). Furthermore, the creditor's
liability is limited by provisions:
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obligation which arises from a sale or provision of services on credit.
In this case he can frequently use either his status as a holder in due
course of the instrument or a contractual waiver of defenses in order
to insulate the obligation from the debtor's traditional contractual
133
defenses.
Where a secured creditor seeks to replevy his security, similar
substantive barriers will frequently preclude the debtor from raising
additional factual issues to prevent the deprivation. Only after notifying the creditor may the debtor withhold payment based on a
claimed creditor breach by deducting the claimed damage from the
remaining obligation.131 In any event, the debtor will generally have
relinquished his right of set-off by the terms of the sales contract.
Even though technical barriers may limit the factual issue to nonpayment, the debtor may still perceive that his defense is real, and,
in terms of that perception, that the deprivation is unjustifiable.
Legal procedures may be a means of reducing the social cost of the
debtor's frustrated expectation of receiving just treatment. 135 But
where these frustrations exist and are a cost of the legal system,
additional enforcement procedures will not significantly reduce
a) enabling the creditor to correct any errors in disclosure within 15 days after discovering a violation and prior to the institution by the debtor of any action under the
liability section, § 1640(b);
b) enabling the creditor to avoid liability if he can demonstrate an unintentional
violation resulting from a bona fide error "notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error," § 1640(c); and
c) providing a complete defense to most creditors who are assignees of the original
transaction where the debtor has signed at the time of obligation a written acknowledgement of receipt of a valid disclosure statement, § 1641.
3 UNIFORM COMMERCL
CODE §§ 3-302, 3-305. In addition, the agreement creating the
obligation in most cases will contain a waiver of defenses clause in which the debtor agrees
not to assert against his seller's assignee most of the defenses that might be available on the
underlying transaction. Subject to statutory or judicial limitation, such clauses are valid and
enforceable under section 9-206 of the UCC.
A number of jurisdictions have limited the availability of third party freedom from defenses
in the case of a consumer obligation, either by denying to the assignee-holder the status of a
holder in due course and prohibiting contractual waiver of defenses clauses, or by permitting
freedom from defenses only after a period of time within which the debtor is given the
opportunity to assert claims on the underlying obligation against the assignee. See generally
1 CCH POVERTY L. REP. T 3125.
234 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-717. Under UCC § 2-607(1), upon acceptance of the
goods the buyer must pay at the contract rate. He has the right, upon timely notice to the
seller after the discovery of any breach (§ 2-607(3)), to seek damages for the alleged breach
from the seller under section 2-714. His right to set off damages by deducting them from the
price remaining unpaid is subject, however, to the notification requirement of Section 2-717.
I" See notes 205-07 infra and accompanying text.
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them if substantive legal rules continue to bar perceived defenses.
The second factual issue that must be resolved to sustain a temporary deprivation is the validity of the creditor's fear that, upon
ultimate adjudication, the debtor will not have assets available to
satisfy the claim. 3 ' Although statutory requirements vary, most
provisional remedies require a reasonable belief by the creditor that
the debtor's property will be transferred, destroyed, sequestered, or
abused prior to resolution of the claim. 3 ' The question of "insecurity," as opposed to the initial question of non-payment, might raise
complex and varied factual issues. If a truly objective standard of
insecurity were imposed, a fact-finding process would presumably
increase the accuracy of the determination. But given the initial fact
of non-payment, the insecurity issue becomes entwined with the
creditor's subjective belief that grounds for insecurity exist. An adjudicatory proceeding in this context may expose additional "facts,"
but importance of the creditor's subjective insecurity insulates the
question from "accurate" resolution.
The assumption will be made, therefore, that the factual questions generally raised upon default are either uncomplicated or not
readily amenable to accurate resolution. 38' This assumption, of
course, excludes those cases where defenses by way of set-off or
M'
See note 129 supra.
131See generally 1 CCH SEcRuEm TRANS.,
250.
'3 It should be recognized that the statutory grounds for pre-judgment seizure are not
always limited to the questions of non-payment and insecurity. For example, the New York
Attachment Statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 6201 et seq. (1963), permits an ex parte seizure upon
the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant has defrauded him:
"An order of attachment may be granted in any action. . . when:
5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or implied, has been
guilty of a fraud in contracting or incurring the liability. . . ." Id. § 6201(5).
In finding the New York statute defective under the Mitchell standard, the district court
in Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co, 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3545 (April 15, 1975), recognized a distinction between the grounds for seizure in
Mitchell and those authorized under the New York statute. The Louisiana court granting
sequestration in Mitchell was faced with the traditional, factually uncomplicated issues of
non-payment and insecurity. In Sugar the issue before the state court considering the attachment order was whether the defendant had defrauded the plaintiff. The court emphasized
that this issue, "which involve[d] determination of subjective elements of motive and intent,
[was] notably unsuitable to determination on documentary proof alone." 383 F. Supp. at
649. It seems clear that the court was correct in recognizing that the probabilities of ex parte
error would be greater where the attachment was authorized upon ex parte allegations of
fraud in the underlying transaction than where the process was issued upon allegations of
non-payment and insecurity.
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counterclaim may be properly invoked and for which an adjudication may provide a significantly more accurate resolution. It does,
however, support the hypothesis that few ex parte deprivations will
be erroneous.
2. Informal Controls as Disincentives to Error.
The probability of erroneous claims also depends on the extent to
which market forces discourage the creditor from pursuing his claim
through the enforcement process. Particularly relevant, in the presumed limited factual context of the dispute, are possible controls
on creditor error in claiming non-payment. Empirical data, although incomplete, indicates that, because of the high direct costs
associated with their use, creditors generally regard provisional remedies as the least efficient method of securing payment.'39 Assuming
that the creditor seeks payment of the obligation, after the initial
default an efficient creditor will attempt to secure payment at minimum expense. Upon default he will seek to maximize expected cash
flow by immediate contacts with the debtor to ascertain the causes
of non-payment and to attempt a "work-out."'' 0 Thus, the postdefault creditor will usually proceed through a series of extrajudicial collection attempts, contractual re-writes, consolidations
and extensions."' As the delinquency continues, these contacts become more insistent and personalized,1 2 reflecting the creditor's
economic motivation to avoid the increased cost of judicial enforcement.
If a creditor fits this model, these economic considerations minimize the possibility of creditor or debtor error in establishing the
fact of default. Accounting errors, payments lost in the mails, misapplied payments, or debtor failure to pay owing to temporary factors (neglect, absence from home) should be resolved during the
"Ig
See generally Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 82, 85-88, 90-93 (1973).
,*o
Id. at 85-88.
" Id. at 87, 94. A 1971 survey by the Consumer Bankers Association indicated that
prior
to any repossession on delinquent accounts in automobile credit sales there were an average
of: 1) 3.6 extensions or re-writes; 2) 10.3 delinquency notices; 3) 12.2 telephone calls; 4) 7.9
personal contacts. Id. at 94.
12 See generally Leff, Injury, Ignoranceand Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection,
80 YALE L. J. 1 (1970); Scott & Strickland, Abusive Debt Collection-A Model Statute for
Virginia, 15 Whi. & MARY,L. REv. 567 (1974).
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period of contact prior to any attempted deprivation.'
The creditor will balance the amount he must spend to generate
income from the delinquent account against the probabilities of
receiving payments from the debtor. Only when he identifies the
debtor as a "can't pay," rather than a "won't pay," does the present
value of extra-judicial collection efforts decrease.' 44 At some point
delay so reduces the value of property subject to seizure that the
creditor resorts to the enforcement process. "I
There may be a number of circumstances in which the postdefault process of informal collection will not eliminate the possibility of an erroneous claim. The debtor may refuse to pay because of
perceived defenses to the underlying obligation. The creditor may
be willing to incur the additional expense of ex parte process with a
given debtor in order to demonstrate to other debtors his willingness
to enforce payment. 4 ' Finally, some creditors might not fit the
model: rather than anticipating payment as the end product of the
exchange, they rely on default, ex parte seizure, and resale as a
means of return on their investment. The abuses attributable to the
overreaching creditor raise issues that the legal system should not
overlook. To the extent, however, that aberrant creditor action can
be identified as "unconscionable" overreaching, it is unlikely.thab,,
these problems can be efficiently addressed through a manipulation
of default procedure without any substantive control of the
bargaining process-particularly where the manipulation occurs at
the level of constitutional adjudication.'47
3. The Usefulness of the Adjudicatory Process in PreventingErroneous Claims of Default.
Despite the general limitation of ex parte inquiry to the questions
of payment and insecurity, the debtor can prevent deprivation in
some circumstances by establishing a claim or defense to the underlying obligation. It is important, therefore, to determine whether
"1 2 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 12-60 to 12-68. Professor Caplovitz identified nine

primary reasons for default, only two of which involved creditor and debtor error in payment.
'

Johnson, supra note 139, at 93.

,, Id. at 90-93.

,,6
2 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 12-56.
47 The impact of the overreaching creditor on enforcement costs will be considered below
in connection with a relaxation of the basic assumptions on which the model is based. See
notes 211-14 infra and accompanying text.
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debtors with valid defenses use the adjudicatory process. On the
basis of existing empirical data, the incidence of contested claims
of default appears remarkably low.' In Professor Caplovitz' study
of defaulting debtors in four cities, over ninety percent of the judicial actions were found to have terminated in default judgments
against the debtor.' Most contested claims terminated in settlements favorable to the creditor; in only three percent did the debtors prevail. 5 This evidence does not, of course, necessarily indicate
that the overwhelming majority of debtors have no valid defense to
the creditor's claim. Uncontested claims may also result from the
debtor's fear, mistrust, or ignorance of the judicial machinery invoked by the creditor.' 5' Professor Caplovitz suggests that the most
prevalent reasons for default'52 are creditor or debtor payment error
and non-payment by the debtor for reasons which do not present a
legally sufficient defense.'53 Nonetheless, the evidence that allegations of fraud or other defenses are also primary reasons for default
precludes the assumption that a claim for default which reaches the
enforcement process will, if contested, necessarily be resolved in the
creditor's favor. Consequently, the only assumption that can be
made is that the incidence of uncontested claims is a product of
three factors: (1) some debtors have no legally sufficient defense to
non-payment and determine not to purchase the additional procedures available to contest the creditor's claim; (2) some debtors
have a claim or defense but determine that their stakes in the case
"1 2 D. CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 37, at 11-35, 11-66; National Commission on Consumer
Finance, Press Release, May 5, 1972. Prof. Caplovitz found that over 90% of the claims in
the cities studied were terminated by default judgments. The National Commission report
based on a survey of selected banks and finance companies found that "nearly 65% of all
judgments obtained by banks and more than 47% obtained by finance companies were entered by default, when the defendant debtor failed to appear."
"' 2 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 11-35, 11-66.
' Id. at 11-67.
White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The PoorPay Even More, 1973 Wis.
L. REv. 503, 528-29.
152 2 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 11-36.
' Id. The nine primary reasons for default identified by Caplovitz can be placed in 3 basic
categories:
(1) Debtor or CreditorError (2) (Debtor leaves town; payment misunderstandings)
(2) Non-Payment-No Defense (6) (voluntary overextension; victim of own third
party; involuntary over extension; debtor irresponsibility; loss of income; marital
instability)
(3) Non-Payment-Defense (1) (Allegation of fraud).
Id. at 12-60 to 12-68.
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multiplied by the probabilities of prevailing are less than their litigation costs in presenting the claim; and (3) some debtors have a
claim or defense for which the stakes multiplied by the probabilities
of prevailing are greater than their costs of litigation but, owing to
imperfect information, cannot make the economically rational decision.
The risk of error upon ex parte seizure is significant in those
disputes with a potentially broadened factual inquiry. However, the
evidence of uncontested claims indicates that this risk will not be
reduced merely by providing the debtor an opportunity to adjudicate the claim unless he is also provided with sufficient information
to permit him to evaluate the alternatives rationally. Consequently,
providing pre-seizure notice and hearing opportunities without additional expenditures to increase information will only reduce the
cost of error for those apparently few debtors who have claims that
they are prepared to assert if given the opportunity.
4. Summary.
The preceding discussion has identified the basis for the assumptions underlying a cost analysis of additional procedural due process
requirements. The central assumptions are: (1) that the factual
issues in an ex parte proceeding are generally limited and uncomplicated; (2) that informal controls on creditor behavior provide
significant disincentives to error in invoking provisional remedies;
and (3) that since most claims for default are uncontested, additional procedural requirements without significant expenditures on
information are not likely to forstall erroneous deprivations even
when the debtor has a valid defense. The empirical evidence supporting these assumptions is, admittedly, incomplete and subject to
varying interpretations.'54 The cost analysis which follows will therefore relax these assumptions where they are subject to challenge in
order to test the validity of the additional procedures in the widest
possible context.
B.

The Impact of ProceduralVariables on Enforcement Costs

A cost analysis of the procedures for enforcing provisional creditor
remedies relies on Professor Posner's classic formulation: The purpose of legal procedure is to minimize the sum of two types of
"I'See, e.g., Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 125, and Johnson (both articles), supra note 127.
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cost-(1) the direct costs of operating the dispute resolution machinery; and (2) the social costs produced by an erroneous resolution
of a given dispute.'15 When this analytical framework is applied to
provisional creditor remedies, it is presumed that ultimately there
will be a final adjudication of the creditor's claim. Obviously, if final
adjudication mistakenly imposes liability by depriving a debtor of
his property where he has not defaulted, or mistakenly fails to assess
liability where there is a valid claim of default, the mechanism will
be less efficient because of the social costs produced by the erroneous resolution. In the provisional remedy context, however, the
error costs of final resolution are not relevant; the issue is whether
pre-seizure hearing opportunities or other requirements minimize
the error costs of an ex parte seizure.
Because of the less searching nature of an ex parteproceeding, the
probability of error upon ex parte seizure ("ex parte error") will be
greater than upon ultimate resolution of the claim. Minimizing this
higher probability of error is a legitimate goal of the legal system.' 56
Since ex parte error is "biased," operating only to the disadvantage
of the debtor,' 5 a reduction in the probability of error will benefit
the debtor by reducing the cost of error to him. The cost of ex parte
error, however, is the product of two factors: (1) the increase in the
probability of error where the initial taking is not accompanied by
a fact-finding adjudication, and (2) the impact of an erroneous deprivation measured from the issuance of ex parte process until the
ultimate adjudication. Consequently, the cost of ex parte error increases as the impact of that error on the debtor increases with
probability of error held constant. The market value of this impact,
absent equitable considerations, 58' is the sum of: (1) the cost of
borrowing the amount of money representing the value of the prop'' Posner, supra note 13, at 400. The basis for Posner's assertion is that the judicial process
is designed in part to apply existing substantive legal rules in the context of dispute resolution. The costs of this process are not limited to the direct costs of operating the machinery,
but include as well the reduction in efficiency of a mistaken imposition of liability or a
mistaken failure to impose liability. Since, as Posner indicates, efficiency is used in its
economic connotation of maximizing value, any reduction in either direct costs or the costs
of judicial error increases its value and therefore forms a legitimate and significant goal of
the legal system. Id. at 400-01.
66Id. at 401.

117
Posner identifies error as either "biased" or "unbaised." Unbiased error is any error

likely to operate equally against either party. Biased error is more likely to operate against
one party than the other. Id. at 406-07.
l See notes 213-14 infra and accompanying text.
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erty rights seized for the period of the ex parte deprivation,' and
(2) the costs of making alternative arrangements.' 60 The greater the
costs of deprivation, the greater will be the debtor's incentive to
spend money in the enforcement process to avoid them. This extra
expenditure in turn will reduce the probability that an erroneous
claim will be sustained.' 1 But when additional procedures to reduce
error are imposed, they may significantly increase the direct costs
of enforcement. These costs include the opportunity costs of the
litigants, attorneys, witnesses, etc., and the maintenance costs of
the system itself, including salaries of employees, judges' time, operational expenses, etc. 112 It will not be efficient, therefore, to reduce
the costs of ex parte error if the direct costs of operating the mechanism increase by a greater amount. 6 ' It is, however, the belief that
some expenditures on procedural machinery will be more than offset
by reductions in error costs that provides the basic justification for
a fact-finding adjudication at some point in the enforcement. The
question remains whether, in view of its uncertain impact on total
costs, efficiency is maximized by providing this opportunity before
the deprivation, immediately after the deprivation, or in the ordinary course of events when the underlying claim is litigated.
Within this analytical framework, it is possible to examine the
extent to which the various procedures that the Court has identified
as constitutionally relevant minimize the costs of enforcing creditor
claims through provisional remedies. The analysis logically begins
by examining the procedural requirements imposed by Sniadach
and Fuentes-notice and hearing opportunities prior to any seizure.
Pre-Seizure Notice to the Debtor.

1.

The Supreme Court has not indicated that pre-seizure notice to
the debtor has constitutional significance, except as a necessary
preliminary to pre-seizure adjudication." 4 But when examined separately, prior notice would appear to reduce total enforcement costs
,"I This formulation does not include any idiosyncratic value attached to the property by
the debtor. This is not to suggest that such values do not exist, but rather reflects the
traditional view of the legal system that where value cannot be measured in market terms it
cannot be recovered.
See notes 203-05 infra and accompanying text.
"' See generally Posner, supra note 13, at 404.
,e Id. at 401.
I

Id.

,' See notes 26-31 and 44-49 supra and accompanying text.

1975]

The Cost of Due Process

only to the extent that, by promoting dispute settlement, it reduces
the direct costs of litigation by an amount greater than the cost of
notice itself. Prior notice may better inform the debtor of the consequences of default, encouraging him to enter into settlement negotiations with the creditor. To the extent that notice produces an
information exchange prior to seizure, it improves the parties' estimates of the outcome of the adjudication and therefore improves the
chances for settlement. But the evidence of existing post-default
opportunities for significant information exchange, 165 together with
the apparently minimal informational value of judicial notice for
defaulting debtors, 6 ' limit the benefit of pre-seizure notification as
an independent means of promoting settlement.
Since notice ordinarily accompanies any ex parte seizure, the
increase in direct costs generated by a prior notice requirement
initially includes only the creditor's opportunity costs of an additional venture to the clerk's office and the cost of delay in seeking
an ex parte seizure.1 17 But a prior notice requirement may also significantly increase the probability that the debtor will injure,
sequester, or dispose of his property prior to seizure. Assuming the
grounds for seizure exist, the potential frustration of a "rightful"
seizure will increase the creditor's costs of enforcing a valid claim.16
The requirement of prior notice, therefore, seems an inefficient
method of reducing litigation costs by promoting pre-seizure settlement. It would appear that prior notice will minimize enforcement
costs only to the extent that, when accompanied by a prior hearing
opportunity, it decreases measurably the probability of error, or the
impact of error on the debtor.
2.

Pre-Seizure Hearing Opportunities

Before assessing the impact on enforcement costs of pre-seizure
notice and hearing, it is necessary to address an ambiguity in
Sniadach and Fuentes.' The Court's emphasis on adjudication as
See notes 139-46 supra and accompanying text.
2 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 11-30 to 11-47.
287 Presumably, if the requirement were limited to prior
notification, the delay until seizure
would be minimized.
"' See, e.g., Justice White's majority opinion in Mitchell:
185
288

The danger of destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if notice and a

hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself may furnish a warning
to the
debtor acting in bad faith.
416 U.S. at 609.
"I8See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
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the primary means of reducing error raised the question of whether
such an adjudication should be required in all cases. An essential
hearing requirement would reduce ex parte error in all cases. Since
most debtors presently do not contest claims for default, 7 ' a system
would have to be devised either to compel the debtor's presence at
the hearing or to ensure that his decision to waive his right is truly
informed."' A compulsory hearing would significantly increase direct costs1 7 2 and in most cases, where the debtor has no defense to
the default claim, the reduction in error probabilities would be minimal. If waiver were permissible, the reduction in the probability of
error would be less because the waiver, even if voluntary, was based
on incomplete information. The increased costs of a monitored system of information exchange before waiver (for example, the costs
of debtor access to legal counsel, and communication of information
to the debtor) would seem to far outweigh the reduction in error that
the system would generate.
This imbalanced cost equation was not unforeseen by the Fuentes
Court. That decision emphasized that the constitutional right was
limited to the opportunity for a pre-seizure adjudication."' But defining the requirement as the opportunity for a hearing rather than
as a compulsory adjudication would seem to produce a smaller reduction in error probability. An adjudication before seizure would
reduce the probability of biased ex parte error when the opportunity was exercised. But it would also introduce an additional random or unbiased error-the possibility that the hearing would fail
to sustain a warranted deprivation as well as fail to protect against
a wrongful deprivation. Because it is produced by a fact-finding
process, unbiased pre-seizure error can be presumed to be smaller
than the probability of ex parte error. Nevertheless, the calculation of the total enforcement costs of pre-seizure hearing opportunities must include the increased error costs of a wrongful failure
to sustain deprivation.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the exercise of a hearing
,7oSee notes 148-53 supra and accompanying text.
,' One attempt to work out a constitutionally valid system of post-default waiver of the
right to a pre-seizure hearing may be found in the MODEL NorIcE ND HmannG FOR PR0VSIONAL REMEDiEs ACr §§ 4, 5, 7 & 8.
172Increased direct costs of a compulsory hearing would include additional litigants', lawyers', and witnesses' time, the creditor's costs of lost opportunity caused by delay in recovering the property, and the additional maintenance costs to the system caused by an additional
litigation opportunity.
,,3 See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
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opportunity may not necessarily minimize the total costs of enforcement. To the extent that the creditor perceives pre-seizure unbiased
error as significant, he will be encouraged to spend money in the
litigation process to prevent it. A debtor who perceives a significant
potential reduction in ex parte error will have a similar incentive to
spend money. The increased investment of both parties in the factfinding process will reduce the probability of an erroneous adjudication. But expenditures in litigation do not unambiguously contribute to accuracy, and the increase in expenditures may, in some
cases, exceed the reduction in error costs because each party's litigation expenditures are a function of his subjective probability of
prevailing as well as his stakes in the case.174 From the perspective
of the individual litigant, any expenditure is justified when the
expenditure is less than his stakes multiplied by the percentage
increase in his expectation of a successful outcome. In addition,
each party's expenditures are in part a function of what the other
party spends, and this interrelationship of expenditures may further
reduce any direct relationship between expenditure and accuracy.1Y 5
Even assuming that pre-seizure adjudication can in theory produce a net gain, the analysis is altered significantly by the debtorcreditor relationship and the context of default. Where the factual
questions are limited to payment and insecurity, pre-seizure adjudication will only slightly reduce the probability of error. 17 Even
where available defenses broaden the factual inquiry, a pre-seizure
hearing option might not realize the potential reduction in ex parte
error. Only a significant expenditure on information will permit the
debtor to determine accurately the economic efficiency of using the
hearing process. Without this expenditure adjudication will occur
only in that very small percentage of cases in which the debtor has
a defense and is prepared to assert it. When the right to a hearing
See generally Posner, supra note 13, at 418-20, 429-35.
at 419-20, 430-31. Additional expenditures by one party will alter his subjective
probability of prevailing, but it may also trigger increased expenditures by the other
party,
which in turn may offset the increase in the probability of prevailing. The extent to
which
expenditures on both sides cancel out and, therefore do not directly contribute to accuracy,
must be regarded as indeterminate.
"' In a limited factual environment, the only significant reduction in ex parte
error would
be the reduction in the probability of false claims of default. This would include creditor
or
debtor misunderstanding or negligence as well as willfully erroneous claims. The presumption
is that the probability of "non-payment error" is small due to the existence of disencentives
to error. See notes 139-45 supra and accompanying text.
'7'

' Id.

850

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 61:807

is not exercised, a pre-seizure hearing option will not significantly
reduce the probability of ex parte error. The existence of the option
will force the creditor to gather more information about the claimed
default prior to instituting judicial enforcement, thus reducing the
probability of a false claim of default even where no adjudication
occurs. But assuming adequate informal controls on these false
creditor claims, the reduction in error deriving solely from the existence of the option seems minimal.17 And since the debtor does not
participate in the hearing, ex parte error caused by other factors,
particularly failure to sustain legitimate debtor defenses, will remain unaffected. Consequently, the efficiency of the hearing option
must depend on whether the assumed benefit in cases actually adjudicated is greater than the increase in direct costs in the great majority of cases where the option is not exercised.
The creditor cannot predict those situations in which a defaulting
debtor will not seek a pre-seizure hearing. Consequently, the possibility of a pre-seizure hearing will require him, in the absence of
waiver, to prepare a prima facie case upon every claim for default.
He must incur opportunity costs, lawyers' and witnesses' time, even
though in most cases these costs will not significantly reduce ex
parte error because the seizure will be de facto ex parte where the
debtor fails to appear. 17 8 These additional costs can be reduced to
some extent by permitting debtor waiver of the hearing opportunity.179 But waiver provisions decrease the benefit gained through a
hearing requirement unless they are premised on a significant expenditure on information to the debtor so that his decision can be
economically rational. This expenditure would be justified only if
the evidence pointed to a high probability of error in ex parte seizure
attributable to the large number of debtors with valid claims of
which they were unaware."' In the absence of expenditures to produce intelligent waiver, insuring voluntariness would require a post'n But see Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 125, at 146-47. Dauer & Gilhool argue that a
requirement of pre-seizure notice and hearing would have a deterrent effect on creditors and
serve to inhibit tortious creditor conduct. Id. Given the cost to the creditor of using the
enforcement mechanism, while the opportunity for pre-seizure notice and hearing may operate to control extra-judicial collection efforts by the creditor, it would not seem to have a
measurable impact in reducing erroneous or willful claims of default.
278 A fact-finding process is effective in significantly reducing ex parte error primarily where
the debtor raises perceived claims or defenses, since the creditor must allege non-payment
and grounds for seizure in any case where he uses provisional remedies.
"' See MODEL AcT, supra note 171, at §§ 4, 5, 7 & 8.
110See generally, 2 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 12-60 to 12-68.
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default assertion of waiver by the creditor and a judicial determination of its validity.18 ' A judicially-regulated waiver procedure would
also generate direct costs to the creditor: He would have to establish a system of post-default contact and waiver, and, in addition,
be capable of producing prima facie evidence of the voluntariness
of the waiver. Additionally, a hearing either to review the seizure
request or to evaluate a waiver claim would increase the maintenance costs of the judicial system itself.
The final cost to the creditor would be the delay imposed by a
prior notice and hearing opportunity."2 In the case of the secured
creditor, delay increases his costs by the depreciation of the property subject to the claim,'1 and by the opportunity costs of lost use
of the property for the period of delay. 84 For the unsecured creditor
seeking prejudgment attachment or garnishment, the costs of delay
would not seem so onerous. Since the property seized cannot be used
until final adjudication, his costs would be limited to the increased
risk that the debtor's property will not be available upon adjudication, and to increased opportunity costs caused by delay until final
adjudication.
The creditor's increased costs from delay cannot be measured
accurately, however, without considering the possible impact of
"' See MODEL AcT, supra note 171, Comment to Section 8. "[T]he
Fuentes case and other
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have made it clear that these
rights may be
waived by a debtor where such waiver is voluntarily, intelligently and
knowingly made.
Obviously, a court must scrutinize the facts of each case to determine whether
or not this
standard has been met." Id.
," An accurate estimate of the delay caused by pre-seizure notice and hearing
depends to
some extent on the nature of the procedures adopted pursuant to the constitutional
mandate.
Professor Johnson estimates the delay caused by the abolition of self-help
repossession and
the incorporation of pre-seizure hearing opportunities to be 30 days, Johnson,
supra note 139
at 96-97, a figure which White finds "sound and probably conservative."
White, supra note
151, at 518. Dauer and Gilhool, on the other hand, point to the fact that the
Court in Fuentes
recognized that expedited proceedings could well be valid in order to minimize
costs and
therefore they argue that the delay would be considerably less. Dauer & Gilhool,
supra note
127, at 123-24. Since the Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.56
(1972), sustained
Oregon's unlawful detainer statute, which provided for trial on limited facts
within six days,
expedited proceedings held sooner than the 30 day estimate would probably
meet the Court's
conception of the requirement of prior notice and hearing opportunities.
"9 See Johnson, supra note 139, at 101-02. Based
on an estimated 30 day delay, Johnson
estimates the depreciation costs in the case of automobile repossessions to be
$57 for new cars
and $36 for used cars.
" Id. at 103-04. A 30 day delay produces under Johnson's analysis
a lost opportunity of
$19 for new car repossessions and $8 for used cars.
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delay on the probability of settlement." 5 Since, absent seizure, the
debtor retains his property free from the creditor's claim, preseizure delay reduces the creditor's stakes in the case. Thus delay,
by reducing the value of seizure to the creditor, increases his incentive to settle the claim. An increased probability of settlement will
clearly reduce costs by reducing litigation expenditures. Delay in
seizure, however, will not necessarily increase the probabilities of
settlement. Delay may, for example, increase uncertainty as to the
outcome of the dispute, which may in turn increase the probabilities
of litigation. 186 Furthermore, the settlement rate is a function of
factors other than the parties' stakes in the case, including their
litigation costs and their subjective estimates of the outcome. 87 A
change in one of these factors produces an indeterminate change in
the others, since the level of the parties' expenditures in the case are
not predictable. 8' Given the complex relationship between delay
and enforcement costs,'89 the effect of delay must be regarded as
indeterminate.
The presumed cost reduction from a pre-seizure adjudication in
a small percentage of default claims would appear to be outweighed
by the apparent increase in enforcement costs in the vast majority
of claims. The probable absence of the debtor results in a seizure
without a measurable reduction in the probability of ex parte
error, but with a measurable increase in the costs of using the enforcement process. In the absence of factual variables that alter
the economic model-particularly the existence of a high-risk consumer debtor whose error costs are incalculable because the impact
19See Dauer & Gilhool, supranote 125, at 144-45. The authors also argue that pre-seizure
requirements would promote settlement by conferring new "power" on the debtor, thereby
promoting equality of bargaining between debtor and creditor and facilitating settlement. Id.
at 145 n.92.
I" Posner, supra note 13, at 420-21. The uncertain effect of delay in increasing the settlement rate seems particularly evident in the case of pre-seizure delay, because it is not apparent that the debtor's stakes in the case are reduced by delay.
"v Id. at 417-20.
" Id. at 419-20, 421. This requires the conclusion that the conditions for settlement are
indeterminate, since both litigation costs and the subjective probability of prevailing are
functions of the expenditure decisions of the parties.
I Increased settlement rates produced by pre-seizure delay may in turn increase enforcement costs either by increasing the costs of settlement relative to the costs of litigation
because of the absence of the litigation information necessary to calculate settlement offers,
or by increasing error costs owing to the reduced application of substantive legal rules to
creditor-debtor disputes. Id. at 420-29.
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of any error is so severel'o-pre-seizure hearing requirements may
well increase the total cost of using provisional creditor remedies.
Whether or not such a statutory scheme would be a wise exercise of
legislative discretion, such a system would appear less justifiable
when constitutionally imposed. This would seem particularly true
since resort to ex parte process is a function of the consensual relationship between the debtor and the creditor, and since the Court
remains unwilling to confront directly the question of substantive
regulation of the bargaining process.
The Fuentes requirements cannot be clearly justified in terms of
their potential impact on enforcement costs. But under Mitchell
and Di-Chem, due process takes on an alternative formulation. It
requires, at a minimum, participation by a judicial officer in the ex
parte process, specific allegations of entitlement by the creditor,
and debtor access to an "immediate" post-seizure hearing.','
3. JudicialParticipationin the Ex Parte Order.
Mitchell identified as constitutionally relevant the statutory requirement that ex parte process issue upon the order and approval
of a judicial officer, rather than upon affidavit to a clerk. The Court
apparently assumed that this judicial approval would reduce the
probability of ex parte error. The validity of this assumption depends in part upon whether the issuing officer requires a pro forma
showing or engages in an independent fact-finding process. 92'
In order to use a provisional remedy under most statutory procedures, the creditor must allege non-payment and grounds for seizure."I If he is prepared to establish this prima facie entitlement by
sworn affidavit, he would probably be equally prepared to do so
before a judicial officer. Since, in the debtor's absence, the factual
question will necessarily be limited to these issues, judicial participation will reduce the probability of error only by eliminating willfully or patently erroneous claims. Assuming that informal controls
"

See notes 214-19 infra and accompanying text.

" Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-07, 616 (1974).

292 An additional factor which could potentially reduce the probability of error would be
the psychological impact of dealing with a judge rather than a clerk. Presumably, the creditor
would have additional incentives to guard against false claims.
W,See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
1'9It is not contended that creditors do not undertake collection actions through inadvertance or spite. The premise, rather, is that such actions generally take the form of informal,
albeit coercive,- collection efforts which are less costly than judicial enforcement. See
generally Leff, supra note 142.

854

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 61:807

curtail unjustified creditor claims caused by inadvertence or spite,",
the reduction in error produced by this process seems negligible.
Alternatively, the judge could engage in a wide-ranging fact-finding
process designed to elicit potential claims or defenses available to
the absent debtor. But because these issues are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the debtor, and because the factual context is generally limited to payment and insecurity," 5 the costs generated by
such an ex parte inquiry would seem greatly to exceed the reduced
probability of error.
The additional direct costs of requiring judicial participation
would vary depending upon the perceived role of the officer in the
ex parteprocess. If the creditor need only make a primafacie showing of non-payment and grounds for deprivation, additional costs
would be such direct costs to the creditor as lost opportunity, additional lawyers' time, and costs of producing records, plus the additional system maintenance costs of using judicial, rather than clerical, time in issuing the process. Should process issue only upon a
wide-ranging attempt at fact finding, the litigation costs to the creditor and maintenance costs to the system would necessarily be
larger. In either event, the costs of requiring judicial participation
would seem to increase at a greater rate than any corresponding
error reduction caused by the procedure, regardless of the extent
and nature of the judicial role.
4. FactualAllegations of Entitlement in the Ex ParteAffidavit.
Mitchell also focused on the statutory requirement that the ex
parte affidavit issue only upon the creditor's specific factual allegations of the grounds for seizure."9 ' Specific allegations of entitlement
have no value in promoting information exchange between the parties, since they are not communicated to the debtor. Further, because the creditor has traditionally been required to allege entitlement by affidavit, this additional requirement will not reduce willfully erroneous claims. 9 ' The benefit, if any, of specific factual allegations lies in reducing the incidence of negligent or unsubstantiated creditor claims of default. But existing disincentives seem to
discourage mistaken claims of default more efficiently than would
See notes 128-37 supra and accompanying text.
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-07, 616 (1974).
"' It would seem that a creditor willing to swear falsely in a conclusory allegation of
entitlement will be equally prepared to undertake a more detailed allegation.
295
'"
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pro forma allegations in a standardized affidavit. To the extent that
this procedure becomes constitutionally necessary, it requires preparing forms with appropriate blanks for the creditor routinely to
complete and slightly increases the costs to the creditor of preparation of the affidavit. But more significantly, it also requires redrafting of numerous statutory procedures to incorporate a formal requirement which does not appear to reduce the costs of ex parte
error to the defaulting debtor. The reasoning that such a procedure
protects a constitutional right recalls the great Dickensian parodies
of official circumlocution, and is itself evidence of the validity of a
cost analysis of procedural due process.
5.

The Opportunity for an "Immediate" Post-Seizure Hearing.

The most significant procedural requirement isolated by Mitchell
was the debtor's right to seek an "immediate" hearing and a dissolution of the v.writ after seizure. The specific dimensions of this requirement are neither clearly articulated in Mitchell, nor clarified
in Di-Chem. At a minimum the debtor must have an opportunity
to challenge the deprivation and the creditor must "demonstrate at
least probable cause" for the seizure."'5 The impact of such a provision on enforcement costs, however, depends largely on unarticulated assumptions about the nature of this hearing opportunity. 9 '
Using the Louisiana statute sustained in Mitchell as a model, it is
clear that a prompt post-seizure hearing opportunity is not an alter"' North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975); Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 625 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
The Louisiana statute sustained in Mitchell provided that:
The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a writ of attachment or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ
was issued.
LA. CODE Civ. PRO. Art. 3506 (1964).
"I At least one court has found that the requirement of an immediate post seizure
hearing
is not satisfied unless the statute 1) requires that at the post seizure hearing the grounds upon
which the writ of seizure was issued are proven, and 2) imposes that burden of proof upon
the creditor. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Under
the New York attachment statute invalidated in Sugar,the defendant had the right to request
a post-seizure hearing by a motion to vacate the order of attachment. N.Y. CIv. PR~c. § 6223
(1963). The court would vacate the attachment if it found "that the attachment is unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff...." 383 F. Supp. at 649. The district court determined
that the New York courts interpreting this provision had universally held that the burden of
proof was on the defendant to establish that the plaintiff could not succeed at trial. Id. On
this basis the district court held that this post seizure hearing opportunity did not meet the
standards prescribed in Mitchell. Id. at 648.
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native to final adjudication but an additional proceeding in which
the creditor must establish a prima facie case."'0 Presumably the
debtor, if not otherwise limited by substantive legal barriers, could
raise claims or defenses which, if colorable, would require the dissolution of the writ.2 01

An immediate hearing benefits the debtor by reducing the delay
between ex parte deprivation and a fact-finding adjudication of the
basis for seizure. A post-seizure hearing designed to establish prima
facie entitlement will reduce the total cost of error to the extent that
it reduces both the probability of ex parte error through a factfinding process and the impact of that error by decreasing the period
of wrongful deprivation. A post-seizure hearing that is less than a
complete fact-finding adjudication will reduce, but not eliminate,
the probability of ex parte error. This reduction will be greater to
the extent that the post-seizure hearing incorporates more of the
features of an ultimate fact-finding adjudication. But a complete
adjudication requires time for the parties to make litigation expenditures to establish the existence or non-existence of the claim. The
more complete and accurate the post-seizure hearing, the longer will
be the ex parte deprivation, and therefore the greater the impact of
error on the debtor. Each marginal reduction in the incidence of
error by reason of a more effective adjudication produces a
corresponding marginal increase in the impact of error due to the
delay necessary to permit that adjudication to be effective. Conversely, a marginal reduction in the impact of error by requiring an
"immediate" hearing results in a marginal increase in the probability of an erroneous adjudication. In order to minimize the total cost
of error it is necessary, therefore, to identify the point at which the
probability of error is decreasing more rapidly than the impact of
error is increasing. In the absence of the additional empirical data
establishing this point of optimal efficiency, it is not at all clear that
an immediate post-seizure hearing opportunity reduces error to a
greater extent than a more complete adjudication later in the process. In addition, as in the case of a pre-seizure hearing, any reduction in ex parteerror produced by an immediate post-seizure adjudi"

See, e.g., LA. CODE Civ. PRO. Arts. 3506, 3510 (1964).
the debtor is permitted to raise defenses or claims by way of set-off is unclear
under the Louisiana procedures sustained in Mitchell. Presumably the debtor should be
permitted to do so to the extent that his claim raises doubts as to the creditor's likelihood of
prevailing upon final adjudication.
2"1 Whether
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cation must be balanced against the additional unbiased error cost
generated where the writ of seizure is erroneously dissolved.
Although an immediate post-seizure hearing would necessarily
increase the direct costs of enforcement by providing an additional
opportunity to litigate prior to final adjudication, the costs of this
procedure should be lower than those generated by pre-seizure hearing requirements. Many of the litigation costs of pre-seizure adjudication will be eliminated, since the debtor initiates the hearing and
the creditor need not incur additional costs when the hearing opportunity is not used. Since the seizure will have been effected, opportunity and other costs to the creditor imposed by pre-seizure delay
will also be eliminated. The principal increase in direct costs will
be limited to the litigation costs imposed on both parties when the
right to a hearing is exercised and to system maintenance costs of
providing an additional litigation opportunity. Presumably the
debtor will incur these costs only when the perceived reduction in
error costs through an effective adjudication is greater than his increased litigation costs.
A final consideration is whether an immediate post-seizure hearing, by reducing the delay until adjudication, will affect the probability of settlement. Since post-seizure delay increases the impact
of deprivation, it decreases the value of litigation to the debtor."°'
Post-seizure delay may also reduce the value of the seized assets to
the creditor. But it can be assumed that the creditor's discount rate
is lower than the debtor's, since the cost of borrowing money for the
period of delay is generally greater for the debtor, particularly if he
is an individual consumer." 3 Additionally, the debtor's need for the
seized property may be more acute than the opportunity costs of the
creditor during the delay. Thus, post-seizure delay may increase the
probability of settlement. Since delay has a more severe impact on
the debtor's stakes in the case, his maximum settlement offer increases more rapidly than the creditor's minimum offer falls. But
the settlement rate is a function of factors other than the parties'
stakes in the case. To the extent, therefore, that delay also affects
the level of expenditure on litigation and, in turn, the parties' estimates of the outcome, the impact of post-seizure delay on settlement cannot be precisely determined.204
10Posner, supra note
21

13, at 418.

Id. at 420.

"' Id. See notes 186-89 supra.
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The uncertain effects of an immediate post-seizure hearing on
direct costs as well as on error costs argue strongly against constitutional imposition of an immediate hearing in addition to the final
adjudication of the claim. A post-seizure adjudication that maximizes the probability of a correct resolution of the claim while minimizing the impact of an initially erroneous ex parteseizure is probably more efficient in reducing enforcement costs. The argument that
the constitutional right should be defined with sufficient flexibility
to permit state legislatures to determine the point of optimal efficiency seems particularly persuasive when consideration is given to
the impact of additional procedural variables not yet isolated by the
Court as being constitutionally significant.
6. Alternative ProceduralRequirements-PromptFinalAdjudication and Creditor-DebtorBonds.
The additional costs of litigation imposed by the immediate postseizure hearing requirement, as well as the additional unbiased error
costs generated by a prima facie hearing," 5 can be eliminated by
confining the enforcement process to a single post-seizure adjudication. The principal objection to restricting the debtor to a single
opportunity to raise his claims and defenses is that delay significantly increases the impact of ex parte error on the debtor. This
objection can be tempered if the constitutional right is defined as
requiring a prompt final adjudication after ex parte seizure. A
prompt adjudication would maximize efficiency if it were held at
that point when the fact-finding process could be sufficiently complete and definitive to minimize both the risk of an erroneous final
resolution and the impact of ex parte error on the debtor. This
procedure would not affect the probability of ex parte error, but it
would reduce error costs by minimizing the ordinary delay until
final adjudication. Since the probability of ex parte error is low due
to the limited factual context of the dispute and existing disincentives to erroneous claims, minimizing its impact would appear to be
a more efficient means of reducing the costs of error to the debtor.
Furthermore, the increase in the direct costs of resolving the dispute
would be minimized as well. The only significant additional direct
costs of a requirement of prompt final adjudication would be the
additional maintenance costs to the system. These would be offset
21 See notes 178-82 supra.
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in part by a decrease in those opportunity costs which may result
from the creditor's inability to use the seized property before final
adjudication.
A prompt final adjudication will more efficiently reduce the cost
of enforcement when combined with another procedural variable
largely ignored by the Court-a mandatory creditor's bond upon
application for an ex parte writ and an opportunity for the debtor
to free his assets by posting a forthcoming bond.20 A requirement
that the creditor file a bond saving the debtor harmless in the event
of an erroneous claim increases the creditor's stakes in the litigation.
If the resulting impact on the settlement rate can be assumed to be
indeterminate, the principal increase in direct costs produced by
this requirement is the cost of the bond. Total enforcement costs
would nevertheless appear to be minimized because the bond requirement, by increasing the creditor's expenditures should deprivation prove wrongful, will increase his incentive to avoid initial
errors, thereby reducing the probability of ex parte error. The bond
will also reduce the impact of error to the debtor by assuring him
an eventual recapture of his discount rate for the period of deprivation. Additionally, the debtor's opportunity to recover the seized
assets by filing a bond in return will reduce the impact of error on
the debtor by permitting him to translate the social costs of error
into a discount measured by the cost of the bond.
The preceding analysis has indicated that, in terms of the economic model presented, the imposition of any one of the procedural
variables deemed constitutionally essential by the Court may well
increase the total costs of the enforcement process. Alternative procedural requirements-a prompt final adjudication and appropriate
bond provisions pending adjudication-would seem to provide a
greater probability of minimizing the total costs of enforcement. A
more definitive statement of the cost of procedural due process
would be unjustified. Additional empirical information is necessary
before the exact costs of specific procedures can be measured. The
consensual environment that generates procedural arrangements
upon default further complicates any attempt to determine the relative efficiency of a given procedural standard. Consequently, a final
question that must be considered is whether the cost analysis is
21 The only recognition of the possible significance of statutory bonding provisions has
been by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 612.
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altered by factual variables which affect the context in which provisional creditor remedies are used.
C. FactualVariablesAltering the Cost Analysis of ProceduralDue
Process
This discussion has proceeded on certain assumptions about the
debtor-creditor relationship and the exercise of provisional creditor
remedies. The factual context may not be constant, however; at
least three variables in the structure of a given debtor-creditor dispute may alter the analysis of enforcement costs.
1. The Nature of the Creditor'sInterest in the PropertySubject to
Seizure.
The Court in Mitchell recognized a potential distinction between
the principal creditor remedies used upon default. In the case of prejudgment attachment or garnishment, the creditor has no prior interest in the seized assets of the debtor and these assets will normally bear no relationship to the obligation underlying the claim of
default."°' On the other hand, where the remedy invoked is statutory
repossession, the secured creditor has a significant interest in the
property subject to seizure,"0 8 increasing his stakes in the litigation.
Where the process incorporates either pre-seizure hearing opportunities or an immediate post-seizure adjudication, error costs are
greater to this creditor than to a garnishing creditor because of the
more severe impact of an erroneous denial of the right to repossess.
Further, the secured creditor has greater direct costs generated by
pre-seizure hearing opportunities. Delay in seizure diminishes his
interest in the property, measured in terms of both lost opportunity
and depreciation,"' at a rate greater than that of an unsecured
creditor invoking garnishment or attachment, who would not have
the right in any event to realize his claim from the seized assets until
final adjudication.
On this basis, the potential increase in total enforcement costs
resulting from any of the current procedural requirements would
probably be smaller in the case of pre-judgment garnishment than
where the remedy is statutory replevin. Whether the difference in
m Id.

I" See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
209

See notes 182-84 supra and accompanying text.
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costs is sufficient to justify additional procedures in the one case but
not the other is not entirely clear." 0 That this distinction was not
used by the Court in Di-Chem as a factor in invalidating the Georgia
pre-judgment garnishment statute2 11 indicates a current constitutional perception that the type of remedy invoked is not a useful
distinction in the definition of the constitutional right. This perception is probably justifiable, since in both the garnishment and replevin contexts it seems that the procedures imposed by the Court
do not efficiently enhance accurate dispute resolution.
2.

The Consumer Debtor Status.

Protecting the consumer debtor from creditor overreaching was
the substantive principle underlying Sniadach'sinitial redefinition
of procedural due process. But Di-Chem explicitly rejected that
principle as a basis for delimiting the perimeters of due process.
Nonetheless, the presence of the consumer debtor affects the calculation of the costs of the procedures used to enforce default claims.
Borrowing costs are clearly greater for the individual consumer
debtor than for a commercial debtor; therefore the impact of any ex
parteerror is also greater. Furthermore, the potential of an adhesion
contract and the possibility of creditor overreaching may increase
the probability of ex parte error. The low probability of ex parte
error was premised in part on the existence of informal controls
which operate as disincentives to creditor error. 1 2 The effectiveness
of these controls depends upon rational creditor behavior in attempting to generate payment on the obligation while minimizing
collection costs. If a creditor calculates his return in part upon an
expectation of default and the use of default. remedies, then the
probability of false claims, or claims in which the existence of
default is subject to greater factual dispute, increases. 1
"I0
This issue will be presented to the Court once more when it reviews the constitutionality
of the New York attachment statute in Curtis Circulation Co. v. Sugar, No. 74-859, 43
U.S.L.W. 3545 (April 15, 1975). The district court, in finding the New York statute defective
under the Mitchell standard, considered the lack of any present property interest by the
attaching creditor as a significant factor in the decision:
First, the plaintiff-creditor in Mitchell had by virtue of a vendor's lien an actual
possessory interest in the attached property. . . . [In the case at hand, Curtis has
never had a legally cognizable, concurrent possessory interest in the property which it
attached; it had only its claim of fraud against.

.

. Sugar. ...

Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
2
See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
2
See notes 139-46 supra and accompanying text.
212

See note 146 supra.

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 61:807

Consequently, some consumer debtors may incur error costs from ex

parte seizure that are greater than those on which the model is
based.
Assuming that the direct costs of additional procedural requirements remain constant, this potential increase in error costs might
justify imposing additional procedures. The problem remains, however, of identifying in advance those situations in which the status
of the debtor increases the costs of error to him. It was perhaps the
error of Sniadachand Fuentes to attempt to deal generically with a
problem that is not generic to the defaulting consumer debtor. The
possibility of excessive creditor leverage and the increased impact
of erroneous deprivations in some circumstances does not justify the
assumption that increased error costs will be present in all or even
most cases involving the defaulting consumer. If the increase in
error costs is attributable to a fundamental imbalance in the market
which is wrongfully exploited by a creditor, substantive rules designed to prevent exploitation would seem to address the problem
more directly and successfully. The Court's unwillingness in DiChem to use the debtor's status to limit the scope of procedural due
process may be a rejection of the use of procedural standards to
control the particular substantive problem of creditor overreaching.
The dilemma remains, however, that without any limitations
based on substantive principles, additional procedural controls have
much less value in reducing the cost of erroneous deprivations. If we
conclude that the problem with constitutional protection of defaulting consumers generally is that the substantive standard is overly
broad, then perhaps more effective regulation will result from further narrowing, rather than expanding, the scope of extraordinary
procedural control. To this end, there is a final category of debtors,
perhaps more easily identifiable, for whom the costs of error cannot
be translated effectively into any economic model.
3. Equity and "BrutalNeed"--The Non-Economic Debtor.
Any model based on economic efficiency presumes the ability to
translate various social costs into price terms. In particular, in an
attempt to calculate error costs the debtor is presumed capable of
borrowing for the period of deprivation the amount of money equal
to the value of the assets seized. This assumption is generally recog-
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nized in statutory schemes by debtor bonding provisions. The economic model, however, does not adequately address situations
where human need is great and the collateral impact of deprivation
is immeasurable, or where the debtor is incapable of entering the
credit market regardless of the discount. In such cases either the
impact of error is so large, and perhaps immeasurable, or creditor
leverage so increases the possibility of false claims, that extraordinary procedures would seem justifiable even where they may increase total enforcement costs. Such exceptional circumstances,
most clearly reflected in Goldberg v. Kelly214 and in the initial thrust
of Sniadach215 would have to be carefully identified by the. Court,
and the nature of the procedures used to protect against ex parte
error carefully delimited. Prior notice and, hearing opportunities
would not reduce error (assuming they did not prohibit de facto the
use of provisional remedies) unless they were a realistic alternative
for the non-economic debtor. If such a debtor is presumed to be a
particularly vulnerable, high-risk consumer, then empirical data
suggest that he will be relatively uneducated and uninformed concerning his legal rights, and psychologically averse to the legal system.2 1 Meaningful notice to the debtor would require an expenditure to increase the information available to him. If the hearing were
not required, then access to the opportunity would also have to be
adjusted to meet his peculiar needs. 7
Assuming procedures adequate to reduce the costs of error in the
context of "brutal need," the circumstances in which these unusual
procedures should be invoked must also be expressly defined. Any
attempt to distinguish on the basis of the consumer debtor status,
without a concurrent monitoring of the bargaining process, is insuf214397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that an opportunity for a trial-type
hearing must be afforded social welfare claimants before termination of public assistance
benefits. The most significant factor underlying the decision apparently was the "brutal
need" of any person wrongfully denied public assistance benefits. 397 U.S. at 264.
215 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
See generally 1 D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 37, at 39-97.
27 A strong analogy seems to exist between the "brutal need" debtor and the social welfare
claimant faced with a denial or termination of assistance benefits. In both contexts translating procedural due process into a reality becomes a particular problem for the legal system.
See generally Scott, The Reality of ProceduralDue Process-A Study of the Implementation of FairHearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 725,
760-63 (1972). For a particularly thoughtful consideration of this problem, suggesting quality
control and other management processes in order to assure the accuracy, fairness, and timeliness of the hearing process, see Mashaw, supra note 128.
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ficiently circumscribed to justify the extraordinary costs incurred.
An alternative, as was suggested following Sniadach,1 8 would be to
identify the procedural protections not with the debtor, but with the
property rights subject to the seizure. To the extent that wage garnishment in particular encompases the problems caused by "brutal
need," it is perhaps justifiable, in the absence of a more accurate
means of identification, to limit these extraordinary protections to
that particular remedy." 9 The prohibitively high cost of this conception of procedural due process would most probably abolish prejudgment wage garnishment as an effective creditor remedy. The
danger remains, however, whenever enforcement procedures are
used to control a particular substantive problem, that a generalized
procedural structure will develop, increasing the cost of using the
dispute resolution mechanism without a corresponding decrease in
the costs of systemic errors.
III.

CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis demonstrates the particular problems
with a constitutional definition of the requirements of procedural
fairness in the enforcement of creditor claims. At its genesis,
Sniadach, responding to a "brutal need," attempted to control creditor overreaching in default arrangements with consumer debtors.
Whether or not this concept of "constitutional unconscionability"
was an appropriate constitutional principle, it justifies additional
procedures as protecting social values that cannot be measured accurately by an efficiency analysis. In addition, Sniadach could perhaps be justified in cost terms had the extraordinary procedural
requirements either been limited to the narrow factual context of
the "brutal need" debtor or imposed in conjunction with an attempt
to control creditor overreaching.
The Court's failure either to articulate a substantive principle or
to limit the enlarged concept of due process produced in Fuentes an
extension of this concept to the defaulting consumer debtor generally. Although Sniadach and Fuentes dealt with analogous remedies, such an extension in the scope of protection required a mark"'5Note, The Growth of ProceduralDue Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding
Protectionfor PersonalLiberty and a "Specialized Type of Property".... In Our Economic
System," 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 502 (1971).
",9
"We deal here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system." Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
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edly distinct approach in order to ensure the utility of the procedural requirements. As the Court implicitly recognized, if the
amount of procedural protection was to be based on contractual
status, that status had to be protected by monitoring the bargaining process. The shift in Mitchell toward state enforcement procedures as the object of constitutional control represented a retreat
from the consumer debtor focus. The Court effected this shift by
undertaking an elementary cost analysis of the pre-seizure requirements as applied to a particular enforcement statute, and implicitly
limited the justification for additional procedures to their benefit to
the enforcement process generally. The decision, however, isolated
as constitutionally relevant specific procedures that were not clearly
justifiable in terms of the cost-benefit equation used to limit the
effect of Fuentes.
The resolution in Di-Chem represented an explicit rejection of
consumer debtor status as the line of demarcation for expanded due
process. But the Court failed to identify any of the variables affecting the standards of due process, perhaps because of a growing
awareness of the dilemma inherent in such a use of constitutional
control. If the new standards are applied only to the defaulting
consumer, then a significant reduction in error costs requires regulation of the contractual relationship. Alternatively, if the additional
procedures are applied to all defaulting debtors, the benefits in
increased accuracy and protection of the debtor's interest are significantly reduced; increased costs of the procedures may well offset
them. What may ultimately be emerging is a realization that the
efficacy of specific default procedures can be more accurately determined by legislative, rather than constitutional, processes.
Di-Chem's ambiguous adherence to the alternative procedures of
a pre-seizure hearing opportunity or an immediate post-seizure
hearing with additional controls on the ex parte process should not
obscure the Court's apparent return to a more traditional understanding of due process as applied to provisional creditor remedies.21 0 In restructuring the equation to balance the debtor's interest
against that of the state, the basic constitutional principle that
remains is the opportunity for an adequate adjudication at an appropriate point in the judicial process. Within this framework, the
Court seems prepared to use a cost-benefit analysis to determine the
" Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974).
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specific procedures essential to any given dispute. Consequently,
what process is "due" may well vary depending upon the nature of
the affected interets and the impact of specific procedures on those
interests. 2 ' But this basis provides little justification for additional
procedures of general application, whether derived from Fuentes or
Mitchell, because they do not permit consideration of the variables
that alter the equation in a particular dispute. Limiting the application of the procedures to a particular contractual status without a
continuing examination of the consensual relationship and the resulting bargain seems an equally ineffective method of determining
the appropriate standards of due process.
The opportunity exists, however, for the Court to release state
enforcement mechanisms from the rigid confines of constitutionally
imposed procedures of questionable utility. The constitutional principle can be implemented more flexibly, and perhaps more efficiently, by limiting the generalized procedural requirements to a
prompt final adjudication coupled with appropriate bonding provisions for the period of deprivation. Within that framework, the
Court might narrow the scope of extraordinary control to the partic-

ular problem of the brutal need debtor. It is clear that between the
limited application of extraordinary procedures to brutal need debtors and a general requirement of prompt final adjudication, there
may be circumstances where the error costs to a particular debtor
could be significantly reduced by additional constitutional controls.
22 See generally, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154-55, 167-71 (1974). Guzman v.
Western State Bank, 43 U.S.L.W. 2398 (8th Cir. 1975) represents an attempt by a court
following the balancing approach of Mitchell to determine the appropriate standards of due
process by weighing the interests in a particular debtor-creditor dispute. In Guzman, the
court held that a summary seizure under the North Dakota attachment statute of a mobile
home used as a residence violated procedural due process. The court found that the North
Dakota statute did not meet the Mitchell requirements in that: 1) the creditor's affidavit did
not allege belief that the property would be concealed, disposed of, or destroyed; 2) there was
no judicial supervision of the ex parte process; and 3) the debtor's access to a prompt postseizure hearing was conditional on his furnishing an adequate bond.
The court determined that statutory restrictions on a post-seizure hearing and the absence
of judicial supervision created a likelihood of significant error costs when viewed in terms of
the characteristics of the property in the case-a mobile home constituting the only residence
of the debtor's family. The impact on the debtor and his family of losing their only residence
outweighed the increased costs to the creditor of prior notice and a hearing, particularly where
the creditor had not alleged an emergency situation requiring summary process. Invoking the
"brutal need" reference in Sniadach, the court recognized that this case presented more than
mere inconvenience caused by the deprivation of some household items; rather, "the debtors
were truly driven to the wall by the seizure of the mobile home." Id.
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But to isolate those disputes through constitutional adjustment of
the enforcement process requires a continuous supervision of consensual relationships between private parties.
The undesirable implications of "constitutional unconscionability" leave few alternatives. The harmful social consequences of
creditor overreaching cannot be effectively controlled by constitutional manipulation of the enforcement process without seriously
jeopardizing the state's ability to accomplish efficient resolution of
the entire range of debtor-creditor disputes. Ill-defined requirements burden the enforcement mechanism; they may well increase
the total costs of enforcement. This is inconsistent with a fundamental goal of the legal system-the efficient resolution of disputes.

